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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
I. BACKGROUND 
Anthropogenic climate change is no longer a debate. The Summary for 
Policymakers of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth 
Assessment Report states ‘it is extremely likely that human influence has been the 
dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.’1 Throughout 
climate change science, literature, negotiations and debates run a golden threat: The 
effects of climate change will result in grave consequences for humans.2  Effects of 
climate change can range from less water availability, decrease in crop yields, 
negative impacts on health to rising sea-levels, change in tropical storms and 
cyclone frequency or intensity, changes in rainfall regimes, increases in 
temperatures, changes in atmospheric chemistry and the melting of mountain 
glaciers.3 While the impacts and effects of climate change vary, environmental 
degradation, sea-level rise, conflict over resources, droughts and floods4 may 
ultimately result in people moving, either temporarily or permanently, within or 
across borders.  
The First Assessment Report (AR1) published in1990 mentioned human 
migration as one of the major effects of climate change.5 The IPCC noted that 
shoreline erosion, coastal flooding and agricultural disruption will cause millions of 
                                                  
1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Press release dated 27 September 2013 
available at:  https://www.ipcc.ch/news_and_events/docs/ar5/press_release_ar5_wgi_en.pdf 
accessed on 13 October 2013 at 1. 
2 Certain predicted ‘hotspots’ and the implications of climate change in terms of human cost are 
mentioned in Baker, Jock., Charles, Ehrhart., & Stone, David. ‘Hotspots - predictions and actions’ 
(2008) Forced Migration 31,  
available at http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR31/FMR31.pdf accessed on 14 March 2013 at 
44-45. 
3 Foresight, Migration and global environmental change (2011) Final project report, The 
Government Office for Science, London at 3.  
4 Kälin, W., Schrepfer N. ‘Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change: 
Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches’ 2012, available at http://www.unhcr.org/4f33f1729.html 
accessed on 16 August 2013 at 6; Dr Kälin, Walter. (The then Representative of the United Nations 
Secretary General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons), ‘Keynote address at the 
8th International Association of Refugee Law Judges’ Climate Change, Migration Patterns and the 
Law 28 January 2009.  
available at http://www.iarlj.org/general/images/stories/WorldConferences/8-2009-capetown.pdf 
accessed on 1 February 2014 at 2. 
5 Kälin & Schrepfer op cit n 4 at 11.  
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people to be uprooted.6 It also noted ‘migration and resettlement outside of national 
boundaries’ might also be necessitated by climate change.7 In his capacity as the 
President of the Global Humanitarian Forum, Kofi Annan issued a report during 
mid-2009 that also made mention of ‘millions of people’ being uprooted or 
permanently on the move as a result of climate change, with many millions to 
follow.8  
These effects can ultimately cause people to move voluntarily or leave them 
without any choice, permanently displacing people from their homes.  The IPCC 
states, ‘If disasters occur more frequently and/or with greater magnitude, some 
local areas will become increasingly marginal as places to live or in which to 
maintain livelihoods. In such cases, migration and displacement could become 
permanent and could introduce new pressures in areas of relocation. For locations 
such as atolls, in some cases it is possible that many residents will have to 
relocate.’9 It is also important to mention from the outset that, for the first time, an 
entire chapter will be dedicated to climate change and displacement in the 
forthcoming 5th Assessment Report of the Working Group II of the IPCC.10 This 
issue is of vital importance and these are just some of the references made to the so-
called ‘climate change displacement’ phenomena.  
A dramatic image of islands disappearing as a result of climate change is 
often portrayed in the media11 and by small island states themselves. The likelihood 
also exists that mean sea-levels rise will contribute to rising trends in extreme 
                                                  
6 See McAdam, J., ‘Climate change displacement and International Law: Complementary protection 
standards’ 2011, available at http://www.unhcr.org/4dff16e99.pdf accessed on 14 June 2013 
at 5 fn 8. 
7 Ibid.  
8 McAdam 2011 Complementary Protection Standards op cit n 6 at 6.  
9 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. ‘Summary for Policymakers’ in Field, C.B., V. 
Barros, T.F. Stocker, D. Qin, D.J. Dokken, K.L. Ebi, M.D. Mastrandrea, K.J. Mach, G.-K. Plattner, 
S.K. Allen, M. Tignor, and P.M. Midgley (eds.) Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters 
to advance climate change adaptation. A special report of Working Groups I and II of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2012) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and 
New York 1-19; also see Kälin & Schrepfer op cit n 4 at 5.  
10 Warner, Koko. ‘Migration and Displacement in the Context of Adaptation to Climate Change: 
Development in the UNFCCC Climate Negotiations and Potential for Future Action’ 2011, available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/4df9cc309.pdf accessed on 10 January 2014 at 6: Chapter 13 of the 
forthcoming 5th Assessment Report of the Working Group II of the IPCC, as well as regional 
chapter, will make mention of migration and displacement. This thesis was completed prior to the 
release of this report and its findings could therefore not be incorporated.  
11 McAdam, Jane. ‘Disappearing states, statelessness and the boundaries of International Law’ in 
McAdam, J (ed) Climate change and displacement: Multidisciplinary perspectives (2010) 105 – 130 
Hart Publishing, Oxford at 107.  
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coastal high water levels in the future.’12 While the image of the underwater 
Maldives 2009 cabinet meeting13 left a clear picture of the seriousness of climate 
change, it also illustrates a unique challenge: What will happen if, as a result of the 
rising sea-levels, certain areas become uninhabitable? What will happen if, in 
certain extreme cases, states as a whole ‘disappear’, permanently displacing the 
population to other countries?14  
Perhaps the most threatened by sea-level rise due to their low elevation 
above sea level are the small island states, Kiribati and Tuvalu,15 both less than two 
metres above sea level16 and facing a real possibility of losing their homes as a 
result of climate change.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
12 IPCC Summary for policy makers 2012 op cit n 9 at 6.  
13 McAdam 2011 Disappearing States op cit n 11 at 107. 
14 Other instruments also recognize the vulnerability of low-lying and other small island countries – 
See Human Rights Council Resolution adopted March 2008 
available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_7_23.pdf accessed on 
13 December 2013. 
15 Hodgkinson, D., & Young, L., ‘In the face of looming catastrophe: a convention for climate 
change displaced persons’ undated, available at 
http://www.ccdpconvention.com/documents/Climate%20change%20displacement%20treaty%20pro
posal.pdf accessed on June 2012 at 3. 
16 McAdam, J. ‘Swimming against the tide: Why a climate change displacement treaty is not the 
answer’ (2011) International Journal of Refugee Law, 23 (1), 1 - 26 at 6 see fn 30. 
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Figure 1: Map of the Pacific Ocean 
 
Source: Map of the Pacific Ocean at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPACIFICISLANDS/Resources/Natural-Hazards-
report.pdf   
 
Less than one per cent of global greenhouse gases are emitted by these small island 
states. Despite this minimal contribution to climate change, their low adaptive 
capacity, small physical size of territories, open economies and exposure to climate 
extremes and natural disasters make them extremely vulnerable and less resilient to 
climate change.17 
The island nation of Kiribati consists of one island and 32 low-lying atolls, 
in total Kiribati covers a land area of 811 square kilometres18 and has a population 
of over 100 000 people.19 With one of the highest poverty rates in the Pacific, its 
people, the I-Kiribati, rely on subsistence activities, mostly fishing and growing of 
banana and coconut.20  
                                                  
17 Mimura, N., L. Nurse, R.F. McLean, et al. ‘Small islands climate change: impacts, adaptation and 
vulnerability’ in M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, 
Eds., Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (2007) 692 - 693 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
at 692 -693. 
18 Forced Migration Report 31 op cit n 2 at 51. 
19 McAdam Swimming Against the Tide 2011 op cit n 16 at p6.  
20 Forced Migration Report 31 op cit n 2 at 51. 
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While the soil on the atolls is poor, the fishing grounds are rich. Together with 
dried coconut, fish represents the majority of production and exports.  
The nations’ limited income sources and its low-lying landmass, with no 
higher land, makes Kiribati one of the nations most vulnerable to the impacts of 
climate change. In this case, the most predominant impact of climate change is sea-
level rise.   
The President of Kiribati expressly rejected refugee terminology and the use 
thereof in context of the vulnerability of Kiribati and its nationals.21 He saw the use 
of refugee terminology as ‘implying passivity and victimization, instead presenting 
his population as a potential labour force that could be re-skilled to make a 
productive economic contribution to countries like Australia.’22 
Apart from the Vatican, Tuvalu23 is the world’s smallest State with a 
population of just under 12 000 people.  This independent nation consists out of 
four reef islands and five atolls.24 The highest elevation is five metres above sea-
level. Other than the Maldives, it is the lowest maximum elevation of any country.25 
In 1978 a tidal gauge was installed in Funafiti, the largest island of Tuvalu. A sea-
level rise of 1.2 millimetres per year was measured over 23 years, consistent with 
the estimate of the IPCC global average of 1.2 millimetres per year for the 20th 
century.26 Coastal erosion is already degrading shorelines, and with saltwater 
seeping into groundwater, coconut trees are being killed and taro pits are being 
flooded.27  
From 6 to 11 March 2004 the Kiribati Protestant Church hosted the Pacific 
Churches’ Consultation on Climate Change. The Consultation involved 45 to 50 
                                                  
21  McAdam, Jane., ‘Environmental Migration Governance’, 2009, UNSW Law Research Paper No. 
2009-1 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1412002 accessed on 7 December 2012 at 7; 
Also see Chapter 2 for an elaboration on the use of the term “refugee” in this context. 
22 Ibid.  
23 A number of documentaries have been made about Tuvalu and its existence that is threatened by 
sea-level rise. These documentaries are listed in Gemenne, F. (Doctorate in Political Science) 
Environmental Change and Migration Flows (defended April 3rd 2009) Jointly sponsored thesis 
directed by Institute d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and University of Liège at p 174 fn 47.  
24 Stallard, Hannah ‘Turning up the heat on Tuvalu: An assessment of potential compensation for 
climate change damage in accordance with state responsibility under International Law’ (2009) 
Canterbury L.Rev at 168.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid.  
27 EACH - FOR. 'State of the art review’ (2007) Environmental change and forced migration 
scenarios Available at http://cordis.europa.eu/documents/documentlibrary/126792421EN6.pdf 
accessed on 1 September 2012 at 67.  
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people from Pacific Island countries28 with some participants coming from outside 
the region.29 Together participants produced a draft statement and recommendations 
towards the Pacific Churches’ climate change commitment. As part of the Otin Taai 
Declaration30 islanders acknowledged that the impacts of anthropogenic climate 
change are already visible, and that climate change will have further negative 
impacts on the inhabitants of Pacific Islands. The negative impacts include: 
• loss of coastal land and infrastructure due to erosion, inundation and storm 
surges; 
• increase in frequency and severity of cyclones with risks to human life, 
health, homes and communities; 
• loss of coral reefs with implications for the sea eco-systems on which the 
livelihood of many Islanders depends; 
• changes in rainfall patterns with increased droughts in some areas and more 
rainfall with flooding in other areas; 
• threats to drinking water supplies due to changes in rainfall, sea-level rise and 
inundation; 
• loss of sugarcane, yams, taro and cassava due to extreme temperatures and 
rainfall changes; and 
• human health impacts with an increase in the incidence of dengue fever and 
diarrhoea. 
In addition to sea-level rise, both these island States have various other underlying 
environmental and socio-economic conditions which increases their vulnerability to 
climate change.31 Also, neither one of these islands has high ground for long-term 
internal resettlement.32 
                                                  
28 Kiribati, Nauru, French Polynesia, Niue, Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Fiji, Tuvalu, 
Wanuatu, Tonga,Samoa, American Samoa, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, And the Cook 
Islands. 
29 Argentina, Australia Canada Germany, India, Japan, Norway and the USA. 
30 Pacific Churches’ Consultation on Climate Change – A Statement and Recommendations from the 
World Council of Churches and WCC Member Churches in the Pacific (adopted 11 March 2004) 
(Otin Tai Declaration) available at http://www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/wcc-
programmes/justice-diakonia-and-responsibility-for-creation/climate-change-water/otin-tai-
declaration?set_language=en accessed on 7 January 2014. 
31 McAdam 2011 Disappearing States op cit n 11 at 125 & 126. 
32 Ibid.  
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(a) Key question  
Climate change law is one of the fastest growing new areas of law developing 
worldwide. In light of the picture painted in Chapter I it is evident that new legal 
issues are emerging. The topic chosen for this paper is one of many that will have 
to be addressed as the family of nations seeks ways to address this global 
phenomenon of climate change and its impacts, already felt across the world.   
The central question addressed in this paper is the role of international law in 
addressing the phenomenon of small island states threatened by sea-level rise, and 
its people who will be displaced. It also discusses ways and means to determine and 
facilitate the best policy option to address this particular form of human 
mobility. Finally, it reviews the international law community’s reaction in 
developing a legal and governance regime in response to ‘rising sea levels causing 
“sinking” small island states’. In so doing, this paper aims to identify particular 
vulnerabilities, examine existing legal frameworks, discuss proposals and progress 
made, comment on “gaps” identified and address the options. It also indicates that it 
is important to look beyond the dramatic depiction of disappearing island nations 
and to consider instead the detail of the immanent reality. Beyond the images of 
underwater cabinet meetings lies the uncertainty of the way forward. 
(b) Structure of the thesis  
Chapter 2 examines the nexus between human movement and climate change. It 
will be shown that there is no clear-cut causal link between these two phenomena; 
more specifically it will be shown that there is no ‘monocausal relationship between 
climate change and displacement’.33 This makes it almost impossible to attribute 
human movement solely to climate change. It also highlights that it is not correct to 
assume that environmental degradation necessarily equals migration or 
displacement.34 It emphasises that human movement as a result of environmental 
                                                  
33 United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in coorporatoin with the Norwegian 
Refugee Council (NRC), the Representaive of the Secretary General on the Human Rights of 
Internally Displaced Persons and the United Nations University. ‘Forced Displacement in the 
Context of Climate Change: Challenges for States under International Law.’ (2009) Paper submitted 
to the 6th session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention (AWG-LCA 6) from 1 until 12 June in Bonn  
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/smsn/igo/049.pdf accessed on 23 March 2013 at 2. 
34 Hugo, G. ‘Climate change-induced mobility and the existing migration regime in asia and the 
pacific’ in McAdam, J (ed) Climate change and displacement: Multidisciplinary perspectives (2010) 
9 – 35 Hart Publishing, Oxford at 10. 
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changes is not a new phenomenon. It also summarises that movement, as a result of 
the impacts of climate change, will be brought upon by various scenarios. This 
chapter further notes that it is not only the impacts of climate change that cause 
movement but vulnerability and the lack of adaptation capacity.  In this discussion 
two observations will be highlighted.  It will be shown that there is one 
environmental impact that can be directly attributed to climate change, namely sea-
level rise.35 The second important observation is that there is an ecological region 
that is particularly vulnerable to this impact: small island states. Before the impact 
of sea-level rise on small island states is addressed, attention will be given to an 
estimate of the amount of people displaced as well as the difficulty in defining 
those displaced as a result of the impacts of climate change. It is seen in this 
discussion that a suitable definition is yet to be found. It is nevertheless important 
not to use incorrect definitions, and to stay clear from the term ‘environmental 
refugees’ since it can undermine the rights of others in needs of protection. 
In chapter 3 sea-level rise as a distinct impact of climate change is 
discussed.  Focus is placed on small islands states because of their particular 
vulnerability to the negative impacts experienced as a result of rising sea-levels. 
Treating movement that results from the impacts of climate change as a ‘single 
phenomenon that can be discussed in a general way’ is often one of the biggest 
drawbacks of scholarship in this field.36  However, this chapter shows that there 
may well be a time when a group of people from small island states will be forced 
to leave their land since it will no longer be habitable primarily because of sea-level 
rise, resulting in a separate group of displaced persons.  Chapter 3 concludes by 
unpacking the notion of islands ‘disappearing’ and the question of loss of territory 
resulting in ‘statelessness’ is also discussed. Finally, the option of relocation with a 
focus on the views of the inhabitants of Kiribati and Tuvalu is considered.     
Chapter 4 goes on to discuss the role of existing international legal 
instruments in addressing the question. While people are entitled to move and while 
most migrate within existing international legal frameworks, this chapter highlights 
the distinction between those who move voluntarily and those displaced with force. 
It recognises that most movement that results because of sea-level rise will be 
                                                  
35 Kälin & Schrepfer op cit n 4 at 6 fn 12.  
36 McAdam 2011 Disappearing States op cit n 11 at 106; McAdam 2009 op cit 21 at 3. 
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internal and that the Guiding Principles37 will be applicable. It also looks at the role 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention38 and suggests that in most cases the Refugee 
Convention is not applicable. While many had hoped that existing legal frameworks 
would be able to provide the much-needed answers for those that are forced to cross 
borders as a result of sea-level rise and who cannot return, it is clear from the 
discussions in chapter four that this hope is fading and that there is a ‘gap’. 
Chapter 5 recognises that the international community is still in the early 
stages in developing a comprehensive regime to govern this relatively recent global 
challenge. It further explores the various options that are on the table. This chapter 
lists some of the proposals made so far while acknowledging that there is a great 
need to ensure that those forced to leave their ‘sinking’ island states are admitted to 
other countries on a permanent basis.39 The debate surrounding the need for an 
international convention is addressed, and it is suggested that climate change as a 
common driver for movement is not a sound enough rationale to group various 
displacement scenarios together and to develop policy responses that are generic in 
nature.40 An overarching framework is not without complete purpose and can 
further identify the range of climate impacts on human movement.41 It is 
emphasised that we cannot oversimplify the issue and that a geo-social-political 
context is important even with displacement as a result of rising sea-levels. The 
only common feature is the fact that sea-levels are rising, but we still need to 
examine, respect and apply the differences in ‘nature, timeframe, distance, scale 
and permanence of potential movements’42 in all movement caused by impacts of 
climate change as well as sea-level rise. A closer look is taken at the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation (SBI) Work Program on Loss and Damage and its thematic areas. 
A strong argument is made that this Work Program provides a framework where 
                                                  
37 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (adopted 11 
February 1998) available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/GuidingPrinciplesonInternalDisplacement.htm accessed on 
3 March 2013 
38 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into 
force 22 April 1954) (1951 Refugee Convention)  
39 Kälin, W. ‘Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement’ in McAdam, J (ed) Climate Change 
and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (2010) 81 - 104 Hart Publishing, Oxford at 82.  
40 McAdam 2011 Disappearing States op cit n 11 at 105; McAdam 2009 op cit 21 at 3. 
41 McAdam 2009 op cit 21 at 3. 
42 Ibid.  
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more specific field work can be undertaken, where more consultations can be 
facilitated with local stakeholders and vulnerable communities, where information 
can be gathered and stored at a central portal, and that this will ultimately lead to 
the development of an unique strategy for each particular vulnerable territory.  
Chapter 6 concludes with emphasising that the policy process is still in its 
infant stage and that it is therefore important not to come to hasty conclusions and 
misguided policies about the status of those impacted by the effects of climate 
change.43 It is further concluded that, despite the urgent need to find a suitable 
policy, a ‘one-size-fits-all’ convention may not be the best suitable solution for 
those displaced as a result of the impact of climate change and that further work as 
well as collaboration with the Work Programme on Loss and Damage are essential 
to ensure that important social considerations and geo-political context are taken 
into account.  
 
 
                                                  
43 McAdam 2011 Disappearing States op cit n 11 at 105.  
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CHAPTER 2: CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT 
I. HUMAN MOVEMENT AS AN ADAPTATION OPTION TO  
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE  
Being one of five key drivers of migration44, environmental factors have for 
decades lead to movement, a natural human adaptation strategy to environmental 
change and variability.45 Human movement or mobility because of environmental 
changes is thus not a phenomenon new and unique to climate change. All the other 
drivers of migration – economic, social, political and demographic factors – are 
also important and often migration is a result of a combination of these drivers.  
One may be able to argue that a ‘clear link’ exists between human movement 
and/or displacement and climate change, but it is difficult if not impossible to prove 
that there is a monocausal relationship between the two.46  For this reason, it is 
unwise to continue along the thought path that describes all future human 
movement and displacement as the direct result of climate change because it is not 
climate change per se that uproot people but rather the effects of climate change. 
These effects are often environmental changes – an old migration driver.47  
Extreme environmental events such as floods, landslides and wildfires, as 
well as tsunamis, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions all threaten people’s homes 
and trigger displacement. Not all these events are impacts of climate change.48 
Climate change will further exacerbate some of these environmental events and in 
this manner stimulate the environment as a migration driver even more. For this 
reason one cannot ignore the fact that the impacts of climate change are affecting at 
least one of the migration drivers.49 Further arguments can also be made that the 
                                                  
44 Foresight Report op cit n 3 at 44.  
45 McAdam 2011 Complementary Protection Standards op cit n 7 at 4. 
46 UNHCR 19 May 2009 submission op cit n 33 at.4. 
47 IOM International Organization for Migration. ‘Migration and the environment’ (2007) 
Discussion note MC/INF/288 available at 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/about_iom/en/council/94/MC_INF_288.pd
f  accessed on 11 December 2012. 
for the four scenarios that set out the tendency to migrate in relation to environmental change at 2.  
48 Foresight Report op cit n 3 at 45.  
49 Morrissey, J., ‘Environmental Change and Forced Migration - A State of the Art Review’ 2009, 
available at www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/events/environmental-change-and-
migration/EnvChangeandFmReviewWS.pdf  accessed on 20 December 2013 
for a clear outline of the debate between environmental change and migration at 49.  
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other drivers are negatively impacted by climate change; families, for instance, will 
suffer economically if crop yields decrease and may move to the city to find work.  
(a) Forced movement as a result of environmental change     
It is indisputable that environmental changes brought upon by climate change will 
have an increased impact on migration drivers. It remains uncertain how these 
changes will manifest and the impact will not be the same everywhere. The 2011 
Foresight report50 identified three ecological regions that are of particular 
importance for the interaction between migration drivers and environmental 
change: low-elevation coastal zones, global drylands and mountain regions.51 Of 
particular relevance to this paper are low-elevation coastal zones, home to 10% of 
the planet’s people.52 In particular attention will be paid to small island states. 
Impacts of climate change such as sea-level rise, changes in tropical storm and 
cyclone intensity as well as changes in ocean chemistry and the degradation of 
coastal and marine ecosystems will have potentially devastating effects on these 
regions.   
The question arises as to how specifically these regions will be impacted. 
Rising sea-levels increase the risk of coastal flooding and erosion of ecosystems 
and coastal land. Rising sea-levels also increase the risk of saltwater infiltration into 
groundwater, leading to the salinization of freshwater resources, which in turn will 
lead to decreasing freshwater security and damaging consequences to crops.53 The 
degradation of coastal and marine ecosystems can negatively impact inter alia 
livelihoods, and more intense and more frequent tropical storms can destroy 
people’s homes. All of these are by their nature environmental drivers of migration.  
 
 
 
                                                  
50 Foresight Report op cit n 3 at foreword, The Foresight report presents the findings of around 350 
contributing experts, based in more than 30 countries across the world and representing various 
disciplines. The key aim of the Foresight Project ‘has been to consider how these global drivers 
could affect the volume and patterns of human migration out to 2030 and thence to 2060; and, 
importantly, international levels to address the future challenges.’   
51 Foresight Report op cit n 3 at 56.  
52 Foresight Report op cit n 3 at 39.  
53See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, ‘Slow onset events’ (2012) 
Technical Paper FCCC/TP/2012.7 available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/tp/07.pdf 
accessed on 3 February 2014 for more information on the impacts of sea-level rise at 8; Foresight 
Report op cit n 3 at 51. 
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The principle causes of environmentally induced migration are set out by Stojanov 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Principle causes of environmentally induced migration 
Source: Hugo, G. Original source: R Stojanov, ‘Environmental factors of migration’ in R 
Stojanov and J Novasák (eds), Development, environment and migration: analysis of 
linkages and consequences (Olomouc, Palacky university, 2008). 
 
Climate change is further exacerbating some of the principle causes of 
environmentally induced migration, found under the Natural disasters and 
Cumulative (Slow-onset) change columns, and the influence of the environment as 
a driver of migration will be greater.54 For the purpose of this paper, one slow-onset 
event is of particular importance: sea-level rise. 
In the event of the onset of such extreme environmental events migration is 
one of the response measures, with usually involuntary displacement often being 
the last option. 
                                                  
54 Hugo op cit n 34 at 31.  
Category 
 
Natural 
disasters 
(sudden 
onset) 
Cumulative 
(slow –
onset) 
changes  
Involuntarily 
caused and 
industrial 
accidents 
Development 
projects  
Conflicts and 
workforce 
Particular 
cause  
Floods. 
Earthquakes 
Volcanic 
eruptions, 
Landslides, 
Coastal 
storms, 
Hurricanes, 
Tsunamis 
Land 
degradation, 
Droughts, 
Water 
deficiency, 
climate 
change,  
Sea-level 
rise 
Nuclear 
accidents, 
factory 
disasters, 
environment
al pollution 
Construction 
of rivers, 
dams and 
irrigation 
canals, 
mining 
natural 
resources, 
urbanisation 
Biological 
workforce, 
intentional 
destruction 
of 
environment, 
conflicts due 
to natural 
resources  
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Dr Walter Kälin, the then Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human 
Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, identified the following IPCC, Fourth 
Assessment Report, findings relevant to the displacement issue:55   
1. ‘Climate change is likely to reduce water availability, particularly in parts of 
the tropics, the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern regions and the Southern 
tips of Africa and Latin America. In contrast, water availability may increase 
in parts of Eastern Africa, the Indian sub-continent, China, and the Northern 
Latitudes. Hundreds of millions of people will experience water stress,56 
whether due to too little or too much water; 
2. A decrease in crop yields; is projected which increases the likelihood that 
additional tens of millions of people will be at risk of hunger. The most 
affected region is likely to be Africa;  
3. Due to rising sea-levels, the densely populated ‘mega-deltas’ especially in 
Asia and Africa and small islands are most at risk from floods, storms and 
coastal flooding and eventual submerging, with a potential impact on tens of 
millions of people; 
4. The overall impact on health will be negative, especially for the poor, 
elderly, young and other marginalized sectors of society; 
5. Overall, the areas that will be affected by climate change are Africa, Asian 
mega-deltas and small islands.’  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
55 Kälin, W., (Former Representative of the United Nations Secretary General on the Human Rights 
of Internally Displaced Persons), ‘Keynote address at the 8th International Association of Refugee 
Law Judges’ Climate Change, Migration Patterns and the Law 28 January 2009 available at 
http://www.iarlj.org/general/images/stories/WorldConferences/8-2009-capetown.pdf accessed on 1 
February 2014 at 51 and 52; also cited in earlier background paper submitted by Kälin (10 October 
2008). Displacement Caused by the Effects of Climate Change: Who will be affected and what are 
the gaps in the normative frameworks for their protection? 
56 Including droughts and lack of water or flooding, mudslides etc.  
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Kälin groups the different context and forms together as five typological scenarios 
that may trigger displacement.57    
1. the increase of hydro-meteorological disasters58 
2. environmental degradation and slow onset disasters59  
3. rising sea levels causing ‘sinking’ Small Island States 
4. increase need for governments to designate areas as high risk zones that are 
too dangerous for human habitation, thus government-initiated planned 
evacuation of areas at high risk of disasters 
5. risk of conflict arising from a decrease in essential resources 
It is suggested that the above scenarios can help to60  
• identify the ‘character of the movement’ (in other words, is the movement 
forced or voluntary?); 
• qualify those who move; and 
• assess whether and to what extent present international law can provide 
adequate normative frameworks to address the protection and assistance 
needs for such person. 
The United Nations Inter – Agency Standing Committee Working Group on 
Migration/Displacement and Climate Change (IASC) adopted the above framework 
of the diverse scenarios,61 while it is widely cited not all scholars accept this 
categorizing of human movement caused by the impacts of climate change.  Some 
argue that movement patterns depend ‘more on policy responses than on the type of 
change involved’ and proposed a range of other frameworks.62  
                                                  
57 Kälin op cit n 55 at 53; These scenarios were also discussed by Dr Kälin in his speech at the 
ECOSOC Panel on Disaster Risk Reduction and Preparedness: The Climate Change – Displacement 
Nexus (16 Jul 2008)  
available at http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2008/0716_climate_change_kalin.aspx  
available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2008/07/16-climate-change-kalin and are 
often cited in academic literature, see McAdam op cit n 7 at 9; Kälin & Schaper op cit n 4 at 2.  
58 Such as flooding, hurricanes, typhoons, cyclones and mudslides, leading predominantly to internal 
displacement. Natural disasters can also exacerbate ‘pre- existing inequalities and patterns of 
discrimination’ Also see generally ‘The Climate Change- Displacement Nexus’ op cit 58 and op cit 
n 21 at 9.  
59 Such as reduced water availability, desertification, recurrent flooding and increased salinity in 
coastal zones, Kälin cited by McAdam 2009 op cit n 21 at 9.  
60 Kälin op cit n 55 at 55. 
61 McAdam 2011 Complementary Protection Standards op cit n 7 at 10. 
62 Ibid; Also see Gemenne in McAdam Complementary protection standards op cit n7 at 10 fn 44. 
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The nature of these five scenarios has also been divided into ‘climate processes’ (2, 
3, 4) and ‘climate events’ (1,5).63 However it has been pointed out that according to 
scientists, ‘Storms, cyclones, and so on are extreme weather – not climate – events, 
and for this reason it is “scientifically flawed”64 to make the distinction between 
“climate events and climate processes”.65  Although it is likely that climate change 
will increase the severity and/or frequency of these events, it is a gradual process, 
like sea-level rise.  
An important observation to make about the impact of slow onset disasters is 
that climate processes, such as climate change, are not necessarily be the direct 
cause for forced displacement but may indirectly cause people to move to regions 
with better employment opportunities and living conditions. However, if it is no 
longer possible to live in a certain area because of ‘sinking coastal zones’ then such 
‘population movements would amount to forced displacement and become 
permanent’.66    
(b)  Estimating the numbers of people to be displaced  
The number of people that will be displaced or who move as a consequence of the 
impacts of climate change is uncertain67 and continues to be debated.68  A 
maximalist school of thought estimates figures that range anywhere between 50 
million to one billion by 2050.69  The most cited amount is the estimate of Meyers 
that predicts that 200 million people will be displaced by 2050, but this estimate is 
                                                  
63 Brown, O., ‘Migration and climate change’ (2008) International Organization for Migration 
research series no 31 available at http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/MRS-31_EN.pdf 
accessed on 11 November 2012  
at 9. 
64 McAdam 2011 Complementary Protection Standards op cit n 7 at 10.  
65 Ibid.  
66 Also see Kälin op cit n at 59. 
67 Black, R. ‘Environmental refugees: Myth or reality?’ (2001) New Issues in Refugee Research, 
Working Paper no. 34: 1-19. UNHCR  
available at http://www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/3ae6a0d00.pdf  accessed on 1 February 
2014 at 1; Kälin & Schrepfer op cit n 4 at 11. 
68 McAdam, J & B Saul, ‘An insecure climate for human security? Climate – induced displacement 
and International Law’ in A Edwards and C Ferstman (eds) Human Security and Non- Citizens: 
Law, Policy and International Affairs  (2010) 357 -403  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge at 
401  
69 Hodgikinson, D., Burton, T., Anderson H et al ‘The hour when the ship comes In: A convention 
for persons displaced by climate change’ 2009,  
available at http://www.ccdpconvention.com/documents/Hour_When_Ship_Comes_In.pdf  accessed 
on 3 December 2012  at 3 ; Kälin & Schrepfer op cit n 4 at 11.  
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contested.70 The Stern Review estimated that 150 to 200 million people might be 
permanently displaced by 2050 as a result of the impacts of climate change.71 It is 
generally agreed that there will be ‘major forced displacement’.72   
Others, who follow a minimalist approach and who place emphasis on the 
complexity and multiple causes of movement, predict that only in a few cases will 
it be possible to link displacement directly to the effects of climate change.73   
There is, however, increasing evidence that the ‘number of people affected 
by climate-related sudden-onset disasters’ is ‘very substantial and likely to 
increase’.74 By way of illustration, the Norwegian Refugee Council’s Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre and the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs found that the number of people displaced by 
sudden – onset natural disasters in 2008 amounted to at least 36 million people; of 
those, more than 20 million people were displaced by climate – related disasters, 
while non – climate related disasters displaced nearly 16 million.75 Climate-related 
disasters are inter alia linked to ‘windstorms, heavy rainfall and flooding’ and have 
become one of the main causes of displacement, often short-term, and the numbers 
of these disasters keep growing.76 The recent IPCC Special Report on Extreme 
Events (SREX)77 also mentioned that the scale of population movements is ‘likely 
to increase due to the impacts of climate change on vulnerable exposed 
communities’.78 A study commissioned for the Stern Review estimated that 146 
                                                  
70 Hodgikinson, Burton and Anderson op cit 69 at 3.  
71 Kälin & Schrepfer op cit n 4 at 11.  
72 Hodgkinson, David., & Young, Lucy., ‘In the Face of Looming Catastrophe: A Convention for 
Climate Change Displaced Persons’ undated,  
available at 
http://www.ccdpconvention.com/documents/Climate%20change%20displacement%20treaty%20pro
posal.pdf accessed on 3 June 2012 at 3.  
73 Kälin op cit n 39 at 81. 
74 Kälin op cit n 39 at 81.82.  
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 See generally, IPCC op cit n 9. 
78  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN University, the Norwegian 
Refugee Council and its Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the Special Rapporteur on the 
Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons and the International Organization for Migration 
Joint submission to the UNFCC SBI Work Program on Loss and Damage ‘Human mobility in the 
context of loss and damage from climate change: Needs, gaps, and roles of the Convention in 
addressing loss and damage’ (2012) available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/smsn/igo/106.pdf accessed on 13 December 2013  
 at 2. 
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million people live at an altitude of less than one meter. According to the study, 
South Asian and East Asian populations are predominantly at risk.79 
 
Table 2: Estimates and forecasts of environmental displacees.80 
 
Source Current estimates  Forecasts by 2010 Forecasts by 2050 
El – Hinnawi 
(1985) 
30 million 50 million 150 million 
Myers (1993, 
2002)  
25 million - 150, then 200 
million 
Myers and Kent 
(1995) 
25 million 50 million 212 million 
Stern (2007) - - 200 million 
Christian Aid 
(2007) 
25 million - 300 million  
 
Morrissey distinguishes between authors that predict a vast amount of 
‘environmental refugees to accompany climate change’ and authors that deny the 
‘existence of the category altogether’. 
The most distinct form of movement that will result from climate change is 
that caused by sea-level rise, but the ‘affected numbers will be relatively small’.81 
Papua New Guinea, where 68 per cent of the Pacific region’s population lives, will 
not be affected by sea-level rise since most of the population lives inland, but it will 
be impacted by other changes such as temperature, rainfall and wind patterns.82  It 
is also possible to identify the potential ‘hot spots’ of severe climate change 
impacts, such as sea-level rise.83 Chapter 3 discusses the extreme vulnerability of 
                                                  
79 Hodgkinson op cit n 72 at 3.  
80 Reproduced Gemenne, François. Environmental Change and Migration Flows (2009) Doctoral 
thesis, Institute d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and University of Liège at 158. 
81 Castles, S. ‘Afterword: what now? Climate – induced displacement after Copenhagen’ in 
McAdam, J (ed) Climate change and displacement: Multidisciplinary perspectives (2010) 239 – 246 
Hart Publishing, Oxford at 244.  
82 Reference to Professor Richard Bedford of the University of Waikato, New Zealand in Castles op 
cit n 244 at fn 16.  
83 Hugo, G. ‘Climate change-induced mobility and the existing migration regime in asia and the 
pacific’ in McAdam, J (ed) Climate change and displacement: Multidisciplinary perspectives (2010) 
9 – 35 Hart Publishing, Oxford at 17; Castles op cit n 244. 
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low-elevation coastal states and small island states, where the entire territory, such 
as in the cases of Kiribati and Tuvalu, is threatened. In these instances it would be 
easier to estimate the amount of people impacted. 
  The number of people displaced by the impacts of climate change at any 
given time should not determine the legal treatment of those affected.84 Instead 
future policy developments should be flexible enough to facilitate both country 
specifics and further empirical research on the amount of people to be displaced 
within a specific country.   
(c)  Defining the issue: Migration, Displacement and Refugees 
Since the 2000’s, more focus has been placed by the international community on 
the social and humanitarian consequences of climate change.85 The issue has gained 
momentum and has resulted in an increase of literature and engagement from 
various institutions and NGO’s.86 Various role players87 have also undertaken work 
in this field.88  
Linked to the inability to determine a causal link between climate change and 
human movement is the difficulty of defining the issue and agreeing on 
                                                  
84 McAdam & Saul op cit n 68 at 4.  
85 McAdam 2011 Complementary Protection Standards op cit n 7 at 6.  
86 Ibid. 
87 A selection of some of the role players involved, selected on no particular grounds and order: 
International Organization for Migration (IOM); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNHCR; (In addition to persons falling with the 1951 Convention, UNHCR is mandated to protect 
‘persons who fear serious and indiscriminate threats to life, physical integrity or freedom resulting 
from generalized violence or events seriously disturbing public order’ as refugees) Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); World Meteorological Organization (WMO); 
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC); UNU – EHS – United Nations University, Institute for 
Environment and Human Security (UNU –EHS); UN Sub – commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights ; Inter – Agency Standing Committee (IASC); International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC); International Federation for the Red Cross; Amnesty International; Global 
Humanitarian Forum; University of Perth; University of Western Australia; University de Limoges. 
88 UN Sub – commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights - Adopted resolution on 
‘The legal implications of the disappearance of States and other territories for environmental 
reasons, including the implications for the human rights of their residents, with particular reference 
to the rights of indigenous people.’ Op cit n 7 at 5, This resolution called on Commission of Human 
Rights to appoint a Special Rapporteur to prepare ‘a comprehensive study on the legal implications 
of the disappearance of States and other territories for environmental reasons, including the 
implications for the human rights of their residents.’ This study was never undertaken; op cit n 7 at 
6; During 2002 the International Federation for the Red Cross created a climate change centre to 
‘better understand and address the risks of climate change, in particular in the context of disaster risk 
reduction, disaster management and health and care programs, with a focus on the most vulnerable 
people.’ 88 op sit n 7 at 5 incl. fn 10; Glogov – Global Governance Project; EACH – FOR project – 
Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios; University de Limoges – Draft Convention. 
Also see McAdam 2009 Gov op cit 21 at 23 for the question on ‘normative case for institutionalized 
cooperation, and what type of cooperation should it be?’ In McAdam Oxford 2011 op cit n 153 at 
212 onwards McAdam provides a comprehensive account on Institutional Governance.  
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terminology. The importance of a suitable definition and use of correct terminology 
is important for a number of reasons.  First, within the context of climate change 
the terms ‘refugee’, ‘migrant’ and ‘displaced persons’ are often loosely coupled 
with the words ‘climate change’ or ‘environment’ to describe people that move as a 
result of the impacts of climate change.  Secondly, when dealing with international 
legal frameworks, terms such as refugee, migrant and displaced persons already 
define a certain legal status and provide certain rights and protection to 
predetermined groups of people. Finally, the differences in these legal frameworks 
are fundamental.89 Labelling groups with a specific definition may either grant 
them some form of protection that they are not entitled to or deprive them of certain 
protection or rights. It can also take away protection from other groups. It is 
therefore, in legal terms, important to contextualize the issue at hand.  
(i) The definition of a refugee 
 
‘Refugee’ is defined in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees90 as any person who 
‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons or race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’ 91 
The 1969 OAU Convention92 deals with specific aspects of Refugee issues in 
Africa and its definition is broader to include 
‘every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination 
or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of its country 
of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in 
order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.’93 
                                                  
89 Kälin & Schrepfer op cit n 4 at 29. 
90 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into 
force 22 April 1954) (1951 Refugee Convention). 
91 1951 Refugee Convention op cit n 90 Article 1. 
92 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems 
in Africa, adopted 10 September 1969 (entered into force 20 June 1974) (OAU Convention). 
93 OAU Convention op cit n 92 Article 1(2). 
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In Latin America, the criterion of ‘massive violation of human rights’ is included in 
the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees.94 
(ii)  The definition of a migrant  
 
‘Migrant’ is only defined in international law in the context of economic migration. 
Article 2(1) of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, defines a migrant as 
‘a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated 
activity in a State of which he or she is not a national’. 
The 2011 Foresight ‘Migration and Global Environmental Change’ report95 uses the 
term ‘migrant’ or ‘migration’ in line with the 2009 Human Development Report to 
refer to individuals who have changed their place of residence either ’by crossing 
an international border’ – thus international migration, or ‘by moving within their 
country of origin to another region, district or municipality’ – thus internal 
migration.96 It should also be noted that someone is usually considered a ‘migrant’ 
if the duration that they stay outside their original place of residence is at least three 
months.97   
Within the discussion of ‘migration’ lies an important distinction between 
forced and voluntary migration. Rooted in this differentiation lies specific 
protection regime and migration policies,98 discussed in more detail in chapter 4. 
(iii) The definition of displacement  
When a person is forced to move against their will, a particular form of migration 
occurs: displacement. There are two types of displacement: internal displacement, 
when people are forced to move within the borders of their own country, and 
displacement across borders. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,99 
discussed in chapter 4, qualifies internally displaced persons as 
                                                  
94 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted by the Colloquium on the International Protection of 
Refugees in Central America (adopted 22 November 1984) available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/45dc19084.html accessed 4 February 2014 see Section 111 (3).  
95 Foresight Report op cit n 3 at 35.  
96 Ibid.  
97 Ibid.   
98 Gemenne op cit n 80 at 150.  
99 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement op cit n 37.  
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‘persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave 
their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to 
avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of 
human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an 
internationally recognized State border.’100 
In late 2013 the Peninsula Principles on Climate Change Displacement within 
States (Peninsula Principles)101 was adopted, with the following definition:  
Climate displacement means the movement of people within a State due to the 
effects of climate change, including sudden and slow-onset environmental events 
and processes, occurring either alone or in combination with other factors. 
It further defines: ‘Climate displaced persons’ means individuals, households or 
communities who face or experience climate displacement. 
(iv)  The problem of defining those displaced as a result of the impacts of climate 
change  
 
There is a complex relationship of uncertainty between the need to conceptualize, 
the importance to protect existing defined groups, and ensuring adequate protection 
for people displaced that do not fall within existing definitions. We need to group 
legal subjects in legal boxes in order to determine what rights and protection they 
are entitled to. Currently, there is no single existing box to place those that may 
have to move because of the impacts of climate change. Vast amounts of literature 
exist on the definition issue that surrounds this topic. While it is not the aim of this 
paper to provide a detailed analysis of the definition discussion, it is still important 
to provide a brief review of some of the discussions and thoughts. 
The development of a satisfactory definition for people displaced as a result 
of environmental factors has had a long and complex history.  In the 1970s the term 
‘environmental refugee’ was coined by Lester Brown, founder of the World Watch 
Institute. However, it is the work of Essam El-Hinnawi, published in a 1985 United 
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) paper, that placed the term within the 
                                                  
100 Ibid. 
101 Peninsula Principles on Climate Change Displacement within States (adopted 18 August 2013) 
available at http://displacementsolutions.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-Peninsula-Principles-
FINAL.pdf  accessed14 January 2014 (Peninsula Principles). 
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public debate.102 It has been noted that this term has ‘conceptual roots reaching as 
far back as the 1930s.’103 By providing a formal definition, the term ‘environmental 
refugee’ paved the way for work that documented migration brought upon by 
environmental crises. It also allowed for formulating projections of future 
‘environmental refugees.’104  The applicability of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
will be addressed in chapter 4, but for the purpose of this section it is noted that the 
term ‘environmental refugees’ has been contested by various role players, including 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), for having ‘no 
basis in international refugee law’105 and because it could potentially undermine the 
refugee regime. In its 2008 working paper, the IASC clearly states that the terms 
‘environmental refugee’ and ‘climate refugee’ have no legal basis in international 
refugee law, with one of the main arguments being that no person can claim that he 
or she is being persecuted by the environment106 as per the above definition in 
section I(c)(i). The IASC also recommends that these terms are not to be used in 
official or unofficial documents.  It supports the argument that using these terms 
could potentially undermine refugee protection and the accompanying international 
legal regime, that it is an inaccurate description of what are foreseen to be mostly 
internal movements, and that it can create confusion between the climate change, 
environmental degradation and migration nexus.107 In 2011, the Nansen Conference 
noted that there was no agreed terminology and stressed that terms such as ‘climate 
refugees’ or ‘environmental refugees’ should be avoided since they are misleading 
and incorrect. It was also recognized that there is a need to clarify terminology.108    
                                                  
102 Morrissey, J. ‘Rethinking the "debate on environmental refugees": from "maximilists and 
minimalists" to "proponents and critics"’ (2012) Journal of Political Ecology Vol 19, 49 at 38; 
Brown op cit n 63 at 29. 
103 Morrissey op cit n 102 at 41. 
104 Morrissey op cit n 102 at 36. 
105 Kälin & Schrepfer op cit n 4 at 28. This issue is also addressed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
106 ‘While the 1951 Refugee Convention does not refer to environmental factors, refugee status may 
apply in exceptional circumstances if the ecosystem services that sustain a group’s livelihood are 
deliberately destroyed by the State as a form of persecution against a particular group.’  2007 IOM 
Discussion note op cit n 47 at 2 fn 2.  
107 Informal group on migration/ displacement and climate change of the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee (IASC) ‘Climate change, migration and displacement, who will be affected?’ (31 
October 2008)   
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/smsn/igo/022.pdf at 4.  Note that a more extensive 
version of this paper was submitted on 15 September 2008.  
108 Kälin & Schrepfer op cit n 4 at 28.  
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There seems to be general consent that using the term environmental refugees is 
fundamentally incorrect109 and that various discussions provide detailed analysis as 
to why this term should not be used.110 
Cognisance should also be taken of the fact that often the environment is not 
the only migration driver.  The impact that other processes, vulnerabilities as well 
as lack of governmental capacity to respond to disasters have on human mobility 
also needs to be considered.  Adding the word ‘environment’ to a preexisting label, 
such as migrant, does not necessarily mean that the environment is the sole reason 
for human movement and that other influences do not play a role. 
In a 2007 discussion note, the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) proposed the following definition as an alternative:  
 ‘Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for 
reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect 
their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their homes, or choose to do so, 
either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or 
abroad.’111 
This definition was seen as a working definition, including both people displaced 
by natural disasters and people choosing to move as a result of deteriorating 
conditions, and it includes both movement within and across borders. Interesting to 
note that IOM does not specify what is seen as deteriorating conditions.   
During 2008 the IOM referred to this definition and also suggested a revised 
definition that considers a sub-set of environmental migrants, “‘migration related to 
the impacts of climate change”’112 and suggested that climate migrants are: 
‘persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or 
progressive changes in the environment as a result of climate change that adversely 
affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or 
                                                  
109  IASC October 2008 Working Paper Op cit n 107 at 4 and McAdam Complementary Protection 
Standards op cit n 7 at 8 ‘While the term ‘refugee’ describes only a narrow sub-class of the world’s 
forced migrants, it is often misapplied to those who move (or who are anticipated to move) for 
environmental or climate reasons.... This is not only erroneous as a matter of law, but it is 
conceptually inaccurate as well.’  In a 2008 IOM Working Paper op cit n 63 at 31Reference was also 
made to the 2007 discussion note and that in both documents the IOM ‘stays clear of the term 
climate change refugee due to the lack of legal grounding in international refugee law. 
110 Söderberg, C. ‘Human Rights in a Warmer World: The Case of Climate Change Displacement’ 
(2011) LUP working paper no. 2011-01-28 Lund University Publications  
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1749357 accessed on 11 January 
2013 at 35 onwards. 
111  IOM 2007 Discussion Note op cit n 47 at 1. 
112 IOM 2008 Discussion Note op cit n 63 at 31. 
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choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within 
their country or abroad.’ 
Whether those that move as a result of the environment make up an additional 
category of forced migrants was questioned in 2006 by Lassailly who asked if they 
are not better understood within the conceptual categories that already exist. 113 
While we have seen that some will fall within existing categories, and for some, 
displaced within borders due to the effects of climate change, the newly adopted 
Peninsula Principles may apply, those forced to cross borders as a result of sea-
level rise is still without a definition.  
In a 2011 paper Kälin makes an interesting point, one where he notes, ‘Just 
as we do not ask for the root causes behind the persecution of refugees 
(nationalism? ideologies? dissatisfaction within the army leading to a coup?), we 
should not ask what has caused relevant disasters.’114 He further suggests that when 
determining the appropriate protection for ‘persons fleeing their country of origin in 
the aftermath of a disaster, it is enough instead to consider the environmental 
factors combined with the temporary or permanent unwillingness or inability of the 
country of origin to protect affected persons.’115 He also urge that we should stop 
talking about ‘climate change’ refugees and that should we feel the urge to ‘coin a 
term’ we should refer to ‘persons forcibly displaced internally or across 
international borders by environmental factors.’  
Somewhere in between the knowledge of the importance of definitions 
within legal instruments and the realisation that it is almost impossible to identify a 
clear nexus between human movement and the impacts of climate changes lies the 
likelihood that it might never be possible to find this desired ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
definition. To fill this void, the use of incorrect terminology, such as ‘climate 
refugees’ often occurs. The above discussion shows that this should be avoided 
since it may jeopardise protection to other groups of people.116 When it comes to 
conceptualisation of the issue, it is suggested that it may be more prudent to focus 
                                                  
113 Gemenne op cit n 80 at 147.  
114 Kälin, W. ‘Climate Change Induced Displacement: A Challenge for International Law’ 2011, 
available at http://www.mcrg.ac.in/DL3.pdf accessed on 4 March 2012 at 33.  
115 Kälin op cit n 114 at 34.  
116 See Chapter 4 for the applicability of the 1951 Refugee Convention.  
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on the character of movement rather than a definition since continuing with the 
discussions does not necessarily depend on finding a suitable definition.117   
For the purpose of this paper it is sufficient to note that we are dealing with 
human mobility caused by a ‘special case of slow-onset disasters’118 resulting in 
people leaving their homes, either voluntarily or involuntarily, and in the specific 
instance of small island states, forced to cross borders, permanently displaced from 
their homelands – the ultimate form of adaptation.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
117 Kälin & Schrepfer op cit n 4 at 2. 
118 See fn 35.  
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CHAPTER 3 SMALL ISLAND STATES AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
I.   SMALL ISLAND STATES AS A PARTICULAR VULNERABLE GROUP  
 
While it has been established that it is difficult to determine the direct causal link 
between human movement and the effects of climate change119 it is also important 
to understand that different kinds of pressures and impacts are experienced with 
each type of scenario described by Kälin. The impacts of climate change will then 
lead to different types of decisions made by different types of households at 
different times and location, making it almost impossible to design a single legal or 
policy framework that appropriately addresses all types of movement120 at all.   
With low historic contributions to greenhouse gas emissions and central to 
the debate of displacement are small island states.  Small in size, exposed to natural 
disasters, with open economies and limited adaptive capacity.121  Confronted by 
various environmental drivers, forcing decision making, there is one impact of slow 
onset events that stands out: sea-level rise.122 The IPCC predicts in its 4th report, 
2007, that it is expected that sea-level rise will threaten important infrastructure and 
other structures that support the livelihood of communities living on Pacific 
Islands123 it further notes, ‘Many millions more people are projected to be flooded 
every year due to sea-level rise by the 2080s. Those densely – populated and low-
lying areas where adaptive capacity is relatively low, and which already face other 
challenges such as tropical storms or local subsidence, are especially at risk. The 
numbers affected will be largest in the mega –deltas of Asia and Africa while small 
islands are especially vulnerable.’ More specifically the Fourth Report indicates 
                                                  
119 Kälin & Schrepfer op cit n 4 at 2. 
120 McAdam 2011 Complementary Protection Standards op cit n 7 at 11.  
121 Hodgkinson & Burton op cit n 69 at 42. 
122 The Cancún Adaptation Framework, ‘Draft Decision -/CP.16: Outcome of the Work of the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Long- Term Cooperative Action under the Convention’ 
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (adopted December 2010).  
Available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf accessed on 3 February 2014 
includes sea-level rise as one of the main impacts of slow onset events; also sea - level rise in the 5th 
IPCC report is discussed inter alia at:  
Real Climate provides a discussion on sea-level rise in light of the Fifth Assessment Report, the blog 
entry is available at: http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2013/10/sea-level-in-the-5th-
ipcc-report/ accessed 22 November 2013. 
123 Forced Migration Report op cit n 18 at 51.  
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that many small islands are ‘highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and 
sea-level rise.’124 These words cannot be misunderstood: small islands states are 
highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.125   
 
‘Four interrelated factors’ contribute to the overall vulnerability of small island 
States:126   
(a) the degree of exposure to climate change 
(b) a limited capacity to adapt to projected impacts 
(c) the fact that adaptation is not a high priority, in light of other pressing 
problems127 
(d) uncertainty surrounding global climate change projections and their local 
validity 
In fact, the vulnerability of certain small low-lying islands and the importance of 
protecting these territories for sea-level rise received recognition as far back 1992, 
making its way in Agenda 21, Chapter 17128 
‘They are considered extremely vulnerable to global warming and sea- level rise, 
with certain small low-lying islands facing the increasing threat of the loss of their 
entire national territories.  Most tropical islands are also now experiencing the more 
immediate impacts of increasing frequency of cyclones, storms and hurricanes 
associated with climate change.  These are causing major set- backs to their socio-
economic development.’ 
                                                  
124 IPCC Fourth Report Chapter 16.2.1 op cit n 17.  
125 The Pacific Small Island Developing States provides an overview of changing weather patterns in 
the region as well as the impacts of sea –level rise in its ‘Views on the Possible Security 
Implications of Climate Change to be included in the report of the Secretary-General to the 64th 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly’  
available at: http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/resources/res_pdfs/ga-64/cc-inputs/PSIDS_CCIS.pdf 
accessed on 13 October 2013.  
126 IPCC conclusions as in McAdam op cit n at 10. 
127 It needs to be mentioned that more progress is being made on the adaptation front in small island 
states and in their book ‘Climate Change and Small Island States: Power, Knowledge and the South 
Pacific (Google eBook) John Campbell, Jon Barnett, at 111 an overview of the projects and 
programmes in the Pacific is provided. More information on ‘Approaches to address incremental 
change in small island developing States’ is to be found in: United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change SBI, ‘A literature review on the topics in the context of thematic area 2 of the 
work programme on loss and damage: a range of approaches to address loss and damage associated 
with the adverse effects of climate change’ (2012) FCCC/SBI/2012/INF.14 available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/sbi/eng/inf14.pdf accessed on 2 December 2013 at 64 onwards. 
128 Agenda 21, Chapter 17 para 17.125 United Nations GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 21, UN Doc 
A/Conf.151/26 (1992)  
available at http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf 
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One impact that they are most vulnerable to is confirmed in the recent IPCC report: 
‘Global sea level will continue to rise during the 21st century. Under all RCP 
scenarios the rate of sea level rise will very likely exceed that observed during 1971 
– 2010 due to increased ocean warming and increased loss of mass from glaciers 
and ice sheets.’129 The IPCC also stated that because of the ‘improved physical 
understanding of the component of sea level, the improved agreement of process-
based models with observations, and the inclusion of ice-sheet dynamical changes’ 
the confidence in projections of global mean sea level rise has increased.130 
According to the IPCC sea-level rise is expected to ‘exacerbate inundation, 
storm surge, erosion and other coastal hazards’ and that it is likely that coral reefs, 
fisheries and other marine-based resources are to be heavily impacted by climate 
change. It also states that it is ‘very likely that subsistence and commercial 
agriculture on small islands will be adversely affected by climate change’.131 
Generally, environmental degradation will be slow132 and certain specifics of 
environmental change in low-elevation coastal zones are highlighted in the 
Foresight Report.133 Examples of loss and damage suffered by inter alia small 
island States as a result of sea-level rise are listed in a recent SBI document:134  
• salinization of soils and reduced crop yields in cultivated areas 
• drinking water impairment from salinity intrusion into coastal aquifers 
• inundation and erosion of coastal ecosystems, including mangroves 
• loss of fish habitat and reduced fish production 
• damage to coastal infrastructure, including roads and port facilities;  
• and loss of territory 
The loss of territory undoubtedly creates the image that in certain instances small 
island states may ‘disappear’.   
                                                  
accessed on 11 November 2012.  
129 SPM op cit n 9 at 18.  
130 Ibid.  
131 IPCC Fourth Report Chapter 16.2.1 op cit n 17; Gemenne op cit n 80 at 177.  
132 See Kälin and Schrepfer op cit n 4 at 15: The process will include: ‘loss of coastal land and 
infrastructure due to erosion, inundation, sea-level rise and storm surges; an increase in the 
frequency and severity if cyclones, creating risks to life, health and homes; loss of coral reefs, with 
attendant implications for the ecosystems on which many islanders’ livelihoods depend; changing 
rainfall patterns, leading to flooding in some areas, drought in others, and threats to fresh water 
supplies; salt-water intrusion into agricultural land; and extreme temperatures.  
133 Foresight Report op cit n 3 at 77.  
134 See generally technical paper op sit n 53. 
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II.   ‘DISAPPEARANCE’ OF SMALL ISLAND STATES  
The first image that comes to mind when the phrase ‘disappearance’ of small island 
states is mentioned is often that of submerged territory.  A preliminary issue 
addressed here is the appropriateness of the word ‘disappearance’ in the context of 
climate change. 
The Oxford Dictionary defines ‘disappear’ as ‘to become no longer visible; 
to stop existing; to be lost or impossible to find’135  
Within the climate change displacement debate small island states are often 
referred to as ‘sinking islands’136 based on the assumption that there will come a 
time where these territories will either become uninhabitable or disappear 
completely, leaving us with images of submerged islands and nations without a 
home.  
In most cases these territories will become inhabitable137 long before they 
are submerged under water. International law governs the conventional ways in 
which a state can become extinct, state succession, merger with another state, or 
dissolution, but there is no law that governs the actual disappearance of a state. In 
these conventional ways of state extinction, a successor state continues to exist, or 
it takes control over the territory of another state.   
The ‘disappearance’ of small island states is not a sudden onset disaster but 
rather a slow-onset disaster that will occur gradually.138 Initially persons might 
move to other islands that belong to the same country. Persons might also chose to 
migrate abroad where human rights law protects them.139 There will however be 
instances where as a result of sea-level rise inhabitants of small islands states will 
not have main islands or higher ground to move to and it will be impossible to 
remain on their home islands, becoming permanently displaced to other countries. 
These groups of people are neither refugees nor migrants, and without territory the 
existence of the states are jeopardised. 
                                                  
135 Hornby, A. S. Oxgord Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English (1996) Oxford 
University Press. 
136 McAdam 2011 Disappearing States op cit n 11 at 109. 
137 McAdam 2011 Disappearing States op cit n 11 at 108. 
138 See generally Kälin op cit n 39. 
139 Ibid.  
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III.   THE QUESTION OF ‘STATELESSNESS’ CAUSED BY RISING SEA–
LEVELS  
Within the context of sea-level rise, and the notion of territories that will now 
longer be habitable, be it because of salination of freshwater or floods and storm 
surges, the issue of ‘statelessness’ arise. Similar to the nexus issue and the 
definition issue, the question around ‘statelessness’ is not as clear-cut as the images 
of islands disappearing under water, taking its nationality with it to a water grave. 
Crucial to this topic is to understand the difference between ‘state’ and 
‘statelessness.’ In simple terms, the disappearance of a state, in this case mostly 
perceived as territory that is habitable, might leave a person without a physical state 
to live in but it does not render that same person ‘stateless.’ The following section 
aims to clarify this misconception since statelessness is coupled with the lack of 
recognized nationality and not necessarily the lack of territory. This is an important 
clarification to make since the issue of ‘statelessness’ is often mentioned in 
discussions about low-lying territory within the context of climate change. In Table 
3 discussed below, it is noted that  
‘Should a state lose its entire territory, one of the constituent elements of statehood, 
it is not clear whether its statehood would continue to be recognised by the 
international community. There is a risk that its population would be rendered 
stateless. While UNHCR has a mandate for the prevention of statelessness and the 
protection of stateless persons, specific arrangements will need to be forged which 
permit for the movement elsewhere and prevent statelessness.’140 
It is important to unpack this statement further and to determine if it would indeed 
be the case and if this statement is true. Key to this statement is ‘it is not clear 
whether its statehood would continue to be recognized by the international 
community’ should a state lose its territory. The important issue here is whether or 
not the international community would recognise ‘statehood’ once a particular 
territory ceases to exist. Will it be correct to assume that if statehood no longer 
exists that the population would become stateless? 
To answer this, it is important to briefly examine statehood, the elements; 
how states cease to exist, the issue around statelessness and most importantly 
statelessness in the context of climate change. 
                                                  
140 Table 3. 
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There is no internationally agreed definition of what constitutes a state. It is 
regarded that the formulation of statehood as contained in Article 1 of the 1933 
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States141 reflects customary 
international law. In accordance with Article 1:  
‘The state as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; 
and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.’ 
From this article, the four establishing elements of statehood can be derived as a 
permanent population, a defined territory, an effective government, and the 
capacity to enter into relations with other states.142 Territory is an important 
requirement for statehood, and exclusive control over such territory is inherent 
hereto.143  Yet, it does not seem as if there is a specified amount of territory that 
needs to be held.  The ‘mechanism of the government in exile’144 also allows for 
interpretation that it is possible that the territory requirement only refers to ‘territory 
to be held’ and not territory to be occupied.  Can one thus argue that a state must be 
in ‘possession of territory’ that is under its exclusive control145 but not necessarily 
occupying such territory?  Is there an assumption that to meet the requirement that 
states have a ‘certain coherent territory effectively governed’ that a population 
remains on that territory to be governed, or can we argue differently? Where 
governments operate from outside national territory, states can continue to 
function.146 However, this would be the instance of governments in exile that has 
always been contemplated as temporary and exceptional. In its submission to the 
UNFCCC, UNHCR indicates that there is agreement that there must be ‘territory 
inhabited by a permanent population under the control of an effective 
government’147 It also mentions that independence has been cited as a ‘central 
criterion’ of statehood.  
                                                  
141 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, adopted 26 December 1933, 165 
LNTS 19 (entered into force 26 December 1934). 
142 McAdam Complementary Protection Standards op cit n 11 at 110.  
143 McAdam Complementary Protection Standards op cit n 11 at 112.  
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. 
147 UNHCR supported by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Norwegian 
Refugee Council (NRC) ‘Climate Change and Statelessness: An Overview’ (2009) Joint Submission 
to the 6th Session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA 6) 
under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/smsn/igo/048.pdf accessed on 4 February 2014 at 1 
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Once firmly established, there is a strong presumption against the extinction of 
states.148 This presumption of continuity of existing states leads to the next 
derivative, the fact that the lack of one, or even all four, criteria may not mean the 
end of a state.149 It is also noted that there have been only a few cases of extinctions 
of states and virtually no cases of involuntary extinction of states since the 
establishment of the United Nations Charter in 1945.150 International law 
nevertheless makes provision for the disappearance of states, but not the type of 
‘disappearance’ that is associated with rising sea-levels. The impacts of climate 
change give rise to new legal issues, issues that were not foreseen during the 
drafting of international agreements that govern the issue around states that cease to 
exist. International law151 governs the conventional way in which a state would 
‘disappear’, or rather become extinct or cease to exist. It comes about through 
either ‘voluntary absorption by another State, merger with another State, or 
extinction by dissolution (voluntary or involuntary).’152 It has also been said that in 
‘international law, when a State ceases to exist, so does the nationality of that 
State.’153 In contrast to how we have come to perceive the notion of ‘disappear’ in 
the climate change context, when a state conventionally becomes extinct, there is 
never a ‘void’154 but always a successor state. This is defined as ‘the replacement of 
one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of 
territory’155 and therefore the nationality ceases to exist.  
What happens if there is no successor state? In the case of a small island 
states that will ‘disappear’ because of the impacts of climate change the 
conventional rules of state succession will only apply if the territory were ceded to 
another state.156 McAdam argues: ‘for this reason the conventional international 
                                                  
148 McAdam Complementary Protection Standards op cit n 11 at 110 fn 33; Kälin & Schrepfer op cit 
n 4 at 38. 
149 McAdam Complementary Protection Standards op cit n 11 at 111. 
150 Ibid.  
151 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, adopted 23 August 1978, 
1946 UNTS 3 (entered into force 6 November 1996); Vienna Convention on Succession of States in 
Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, adopted 8 April 1983, UN Doc A/CONF.117/14 (not 
in force yet).  
152 McAdam, J. Climate change, forced migration, and international law (2011) Oxford University 
Press, Oxford at 127.  
153 McAdam 2011 Disappearing States op cit n 11 at129. 
154 McAdam 2011 Oxford op cit n 152 Disappearing States at 127.  
155 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties Art 2(1)(b); Vienna 
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts Art 2(1)(a). 
156 McAdam 2011 Oxford op cit n 152 at 128.  
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law rules on extinction are largely inapplicable to the climate change context.’157  
Without the use of existing international law to determine if a state has ceased to 
exist, the elements that lead to the creation of a state are examined and used to 
determine if there is a point where ‘the absence of certain criteria of statehood 
might lead other states (and the international community, through international 
organizations) to conclude that a state no longer exists.’158 Literature indicates that 
all four criteria need to be fulfilled for a state to come into existence, yet it does not 
imply that the lack of certain elements may result in the end of a state.159 In 
addition, there is a strong assumption of ‘continuity of existing states’.160 
Statelessness is a legal concept that is not dealt with very well.161 When the 
issue is combined with climate change, it brings even more challenges. Two 
existing legal instruments need to be discussed in order to further clarify the 
misconception that the disappearance of territory implies statelessness. Currently 
statelessness is dealt with by the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons162 as well as the 1961 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons. In accordance with Article 1 of the 1954 convention a ‘stateless person’ 
refers to a ‘person who is not considered as a national by any State under the 
operation of its law’. 
It is important to differentiate between ‘statehood’ and ‘statelessness’. 
Statelessness means that someone is ‘without a nationality not without a state’163 
and that it is a result of the lack of recognition of such nationality by the 
international community.  It is my interpretation that when all four elements of 
statehood cease to exist, a person is indeed without a state. However, this does not 
render the same person ‘stateless’ under Article 1 of the 1954 Convention because 
in order to meet this definition this person should not be considered a national by 
any state under the operation of its law. It thus depends on not receiving this 
particular recognition and not necessarily territory that ‘disappears’. The 
                                                  
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid. 
159 McAdam 2011 Oxford op cit n 152 at 129.  
160 McAdam 2011 Oxford op cit n 152 at 128.  
161 Johnstone Craig, former deputy High Commissioner of the UNHCR during side event at Bonn 
Germany June 2009, author in attendance; see generally Kälin & Schrepfer op cit n 4 at 37 – 40. 
162 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, adopted 28 September 1954, 360 UNTS 
117 (entered into force 6 June 1960).  
163 Kälin op cit n 39 at 101.  
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recognition of nationality is of vital importance to island communities and is a 
discussion that will be picked up again later in this Chapter.  
International law does protect nationality: Article 15 of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights recognises every persons right to nationality. It 
stipulates:  
‘everyone has a right to a nationality. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.’ 
Corollary to this is the principle of prevention of statelessness.  The principles of 
nationality and prevention of statelessness are both addressed in specific 
instruments164 as well as other international and regional human rights 
instruments.165 Where foreseeable, statelessness should be prevented166 but once 
again these instruments were drafted before climate change issues emerged. During 
1996, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) gave a global mandate to 
UNHCR to engage in preventing and reducing statelessness as well as to protect 
stateless persons.167  
In its 2009 submission168 to the UNFCCC, UNHCR submitted two possible 
options to prevent statelessness in the context of small island states.  
1. Territory elsewhere would be ceded to the affected State to ensure its 
continued existence. If other States agree that this was the same State, 
statelessness would not arise; 
2. Union with another state would be another option169 
                                                  
164 The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, adopted 30 August 1961, 989 UNTS 175 
(entered into force 13 December 1975) (1961 Statelessness Convention). 
specifically deals with the prevention and reduction of statelessness.  
165 May 2009 submission op cit n 147 at : 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child; 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families; 1979 Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; The 1965 International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the 1957 Convention on the Nationality of 
Married Women. At a regional level: 1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 
the 2005 Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam, the 1948 American Declaration on the Rights 
and Duties of Man, the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights and the 1997 European 
Convention on nationality.  
166 UNHCR May 2009 submission op cit n 147 at 2.  
167 General Assembly Resolution GA/RES/50/152, 9 February 1996, paras. 14-15 and unhcr 
submission p2, footnote 11. ‘This mandate is additional to its earlier mandate to undertake the 
functions foreseen under Article 11 of the 1961 Convention first given in 1974 and then extended 
through resolutions GA/RES/3274(XXIX), 10 December 1974, and GA/RES/31/36/, 30 November 
1976.’   
168 UNHCR May 2009 submission op cit n 147 at 2.  
169 Safeguards to prevent statelessness are provided for in this instance by the 1961 Convention and 
the Draft Articles on the Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to Succession of States.  In 
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Whether or not small island states would consider the latter option remains an open 
question. 
The 1954 Convention170 considers a ‘stateless person’ a ‘person who is not 
considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.’ International 
law171 generally deals with de jure statelessness that is based on the ‘denial of 
nationality through the operation of the law of a particular State’172 and not de facto 
statelessness ‘where a person formally has a nationality, but which is ineffective in 
practice.’173 However, the non- binding Final Act of the 1954 Convention relating 
to the Status of Stateless Persons suggests ‘persons who are stateless de facto 
should as far as possible be treated as stateless de jure to enable them to acquire an 
effective nationality’174 
A 2009 Report submitted by the Secretary-General to the UNGA highlights 
the prevention of statelessness and it also lists unprecedented climate change 
challenges for which the existing mechanisms may not be able to provide adequate 
solutions:175 
[.....] A second is the prospect of ‘statelessness’ of citizens of submerged island 
nations, which raises important legal issues concerning national sovereignty, 
claims over marine resources, and the rights and relocation of citizens of such 
territories. Legal and political arrangements may be necessary for the protection of 
affected populations. 
The principle of prevention of statelessness is also highlighted in this and refers to 
‘the possibility of new cases of statelessness in the context of submerged small 
island states’ - and ‘suggests multilateral comprehensive agreements as a legal basis 
                                                                                                                                         
accordance with Article 21 ‘citizenship should be automatically extended to all citizens of the 
predecessor island State,’ as in UNHCR May 2009 submission op cit n 147 at 2. Also, Article 10 of 
the 1961 Convention deals with the transfer of territory. In accordance with paragraph 1, ‘every 
treaty between Contracting States providing for the transfer of territory shall include provisions 
designed to secure that no person shall become stateless as a result of the transfer. A Contracting 
State shall use its best endeavours to secure that any such treaty made my it with a State which is not 
a party to this Convention includes such provisions.’ paragraph 2: ‘In the absence of such provisions 
a Contracting State to which territory is transferred or which otherwise acquires territory shall confer 
its nationality on such persons as would otherwise become stateless as a result of the transfer of 
acquisition.’  
170 UN Convention on Statelessness op cit n 162. 
171 1954 Convention Art 1(1).  
172 McAdam 2011 Disappearing States op cit n 11 Disappearing states at 119.  
173 Ibid; See generally UNHCR May 2009 submission op cit n 147.  
174 McAdam 2011 Disappearing States op cit n 11 at 119 and 120.  
175 United Nations General Assembly ‘Climate change and its possible security implications’ Report 
of the Secretary – General A/64/350 (11 September 2009) available at 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ad5e6380.pdf accessed on 12 January 2013 at para 72 & 101.  
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regulating admittance to identified territories, stay and status of affected 
populations’176 
Some important observations need to be made in terms of statelessness and 
relying on the 1961 Statelessness Convention. First of all, the Convention is 
‘reactive rather than proactive’177 and can only be relied upon once an individual 
enters the country of another, secondly the Convention is poorly ratified, and most 
countries do not have ‘formal procedures’ in place to determine the legal status of a 
person that may be stateless, thus no clear way of how the Convention’s benefits 
can be accessed.178 Also, statelessness is when someone is denied his or her 
nationality. Given the global nature of climate change and the obligation amongst 
states to cooperate, it remains to be seen if the international community would deny 
those displaced by climate change their nationality.   
A further crucial issue is that small island states have indicated that they 
will try to maintain their presence of statehood as long as possible.179 It is possible 
that small island states will be recognized as a legal entity as long as they have a 
government and a population maintaining citizenship, and if nobody is ready to 
formally end their statehood.180 In this regard it has been pointed out that 
international law would be ‘flexible enough to provide for the continued existence 
of such states as non-territorial entities’181 What is then important is not to try and 
answer the question around statelessness but instead to address the issue around 
protecting the rights of citizens of territories that will no longer be habitable or that 
will be inundated by sea-level rise and to ensure that they ‘are admitted to other 
countries on a permanent basis where they can keep their nationality of origin even 
                                                  
176 Kälin & Schrepfer op cit n 4 at 51.  
177 McAdam, Jane. (Professor, Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales), Address at the 
Nansen Initiative, Pacific Regional Consultation  ‘Climate Change, Displacement and the Role of 
International Law and Policy’ 22 May 2013 Cook Islands available at 
http://www.nanseninitiative.org/sites/default/files/Climate%20Change,%20Displacement%20and%
20the%20Role%20of%20International%20Law%20and%20Policy.pdf  accessed on 12 January 
2014 at 2.  
178 McAdam Cook Islands op cit n 177 at 3. 
179 In McAdam Swimming Against the Tide 2011 op cit n 16 at 6 fn 30 reference is made to the 
President of Kiribati mentioning the possibility of eventually relocating the government to Banaba, 
situated on high land, to continue a presence on their territory for as long as possible.  
180 Kälin op cit n39 at 102.  
181Ibid.  
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if they or their descendants acquire the nationality of that country and how their 
rights can be guaranteed in a way to avoid marginalisation.’182 
In the context of sea-level rise threatening the complete physical loss of small 
island state territories, it is not correct to assume that this loss indicates the practical 
end of the national sovereignty and the protection and rights of these states and its 
people since states will continue to exist de jure and not de facto as imagined when 
the word ‘disappear’ is used.183  
IV. OPTION OF RELOCATION   
Not having high ground for internal resettlement is a significant problem for small 
island states when faced with sea - level rise. For most problems or rising issues 
one makes an attempt to try and identify options, answers and/or solutions. Within 
the context of ‘entire islands disappearing’, one solution that has been mentioned is 
that of relocating the people of those territories to a new home. Since there is no 
available land to occupy within the existing borders, this relocation will be of an 
international nature.  
In 2005 and at the 60th session of the UNGA, Anote Tong, the President of 
Kiribati highlighted that it might be too late to consider other forms of adaptation 
but that there is a need for nations to seriously consider the ultimate form of 
adapting to climate change, relocation.184 The people of Kiribati have migrated 
before.  Phosphate mining destroyed Kiribati’s Banaba Island and its environment 
in the 1940’s, resulting in the vast majority of the population migrating to Rabi in 
Fiji. It has been reported that during 2005, the Carteret Islands of Papua New 
Guinea became the first inhabitants of low-lying islands to evacuate and resettle 
their 2600 islanders to Bougainville Island, a larger island.185 The islanders from 
                                                  
182 Ibid. 
183 Hodgkinson & Burton op cit n 69 at 42-  
184 Forced Migration Report op cit n 18 at 51; See McAdam Oxford op cit n 152 at 143 for reference 
to 86 relocations of whole communities within the Pacific.  
185 UN Secretary General Report op cit 175 at 20; IRIN, Service of the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Humanitarian news and analysis, ‘Papua New Guinea: The 
world’s first climate change “refugees”’  
available at http://www.irinnews.org/report/78630/papua-new-guinea-the-world-s-first-climate-
change-refugees accessed on 3 February 2014.  
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the Bay of Bengal and Vanuatu were also forced to move as a result of sea-level 
rise.186  
Relocation of the remaining inhabitants, as the ultimate form of adaptation, 
is an option that cannot be ignored.187  Some of a countries’ citizens may 
voluntarily migrate to countries where they can be absorbed as part of the 
workforce; however, there will be cases of islanders that will not have the capacity 
to move nor the desire and who will stay close to their homeland for as long as 
possible. It is preparedness and foresight to assist those that need to be relocated 
that is much needed. Both islands, Kiribati and Tuvalu have addressed the option of 
relocation with Australia and New Zealand188 and while there are reports of the 
Tuvaluan Prime Minister stating that the possibility of buying land in a ‘near-by 
country, in case we become refugees to the impacts of climate change’189 has been 
explored, the general feeling regarding relocation plans is that people do not want 
to contemplate it as a potential option.190 Also, in principle international law would 
not prevent ‘the reconstruction of a State such as Kiribati or Tuvalu within an 
existing State, such as Australia’ but the ‘political likelihood’ of this happening is 
slim.191  
Interesting topic nonetheless, one that can be debated academically across 
various forums, but these discussions need to incorporate the wish of affected 
communities. While it is evident from the input192 provided to the Secretary 
General Report that Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) expressed inter 
alia the likelihood of loss of islands and that ‘once the islands are lost to sea-level 
rise, the people will never be able to return to their homelands.’193 Inhabitants of 
                                                  
186 Forced Migration Report op cit n 18 at 20; McAdam 2011 Disappearing states op cit n 16 at 3 fn 
10.  
187 Hugo op cit n 83 at 28 discusses lessons drawn from resettlement experience within countries in 
the Asia – Pacific region and it is mentioned that these can be used to draw upon in efforts to plan 
resettlement as a result of climate change – related movement. It needs to be noted that most of these 
examples relates to internal resettlement.  
188 McAdam 2011 Oxford op cit n 7 at 144.  
189 Ibid. 
190 McAdam 2011 Oxford op cit n 7 at 145. This section also gives a good overview of the various 
statements made by the Tuvaluan Government and the general feeling regarding the option of 
relocation.  
191 McAdam Oxford op cit n 7 at 147. This section also provides a detailed discussion of such a 
possibility and the principles of international law relating to the cession of territory that needs to be 
adhered to.  
192 In response to call made in A1RES/63/281.  
193 SIDS views at op cit n 125 at 11.  
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islands have strong ties and connection with their land194 and the predominant wish 
is to remain in their homes for as long as possible.195  Yet in 2008, Anote Tong, the 
President of Kiribati states196: 
‘We want to begin that [migration] now, and do it over the next twenty, thirty or 
forty years, rather than merely, in fifty to sixty years time, simply come looking for 
somewhere to settle our one hundred thousand people because they can no longer 
live in Kiribati, because they will either be dead or drown. We begin the process 
now, it’s a win-win for all and very painless, but I think if we come as refugees, in 
fifty to sixty years time, I think they would become a football to be kicked around.’  
It is an unfortunate reality that in certain instances inhabitants of small island states 
will be forced to leave their homes and country, permanently.  
 
                                                  
194 Kälin & Schrepfer op cit n 4 at 43.  
195 McAdam Swimming Against the Tide 2011 op cit n 16 at 3.  
196 McAdam 2011 Oxford op cit n7 at 1.  
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CHAPTER 4 THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ADDRESSING THE 
QUESTION OF DISPLACEMENT CAUSED BY SEA–LEVEL RISE 
 
I.  EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND SOFT LAW 
Various bodies of international law are important and relevant to this discussion, 
including international refugee law, international human rights law, international 
humanitarian law and international environmental law.197 Each of these branches 
has their own specific legal instruments and principles that may be applicable in 
certain instances. However, as will be elaborated on below, they do not necessarily 
provide the answer to small islands states, threatened by sea-level rise, and its 
people that will be displaced.  
In a 2011 review198 commissioned as part of the Foresight Project referred 
to in Chapter 2, the different legal and normative frameworks that are relevant to 
human movement, both internal and across borders, are listed as:  
1. ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Free mobility within states and 
right to leave and re-enter one’s own country; right to seek and enjoy asylum 
                                                  
197 Inter alia the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees – in accordance with the 1951 
Convention, Stateless Refugees are protected and are defined as persons ‘who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, 
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’  Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees, adopted 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267(entered into force 4 October 1967);The 
preamble of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons reads: ‘Considering that 
only those stateless persons who are also refugee are covered by the Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, and that there are many stateless persons who are not covered 
by that Convention.’ The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness; Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness (adopted 30 Aug 1961) entered into force 13 December 1975 989 UNTS 
175 (1961 Convention); Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (adopted 
23 August 1978 entered into force 6 November 1966) 1946 UNTS 3; Vienna Convention on 
Succession of States in Respect of State Property  (adopted 8 April 1983, not yet in force) Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement, these principles reflect international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law. The international community recognizes these set of principals as an 
important international framework for the protection of IDPs. These principles have also been used 
increasingly by States in the development of national laws or policies in Africa. (2008 ISAC 
working paper; also note that ‘states that have ratified the Great Lakes Protocol on internal 
displacement are obliged to incorporate them into their domestic law.’) Other frameworks include, 
The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights; United Nations International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Hyogo Framework, International Migration Law. 
198  Martin, Susan. F., ‘Review of legal and political framework which affects migration, including 
institutional architecture and capacity and how it is affected by future environmental change’ 2011  
available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/foresight/docs/migration/drivers/11-1183-dr13-review-
legal-and-political-framework-affects-migration.pdf accessed on 4 December 2013 at 34. 
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(no government had an obligation to provide asylum or to admit those 
seeking entry); 
2. ‘General human rights conventions, including International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic and Social 
Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Convention on Racial Equality 
and Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women; 
3. [‘Voluntary’ migration conventions, including Convention on the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families and International Labour 
Organization conventions (poorly ratified)];199  
4. ‘Involuntary displacement instruments, including Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (strong ratifications) Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement (non-binding) and Humanitarian Law (Laws of War) Common 
Article 3 on civilian protection (strong ratifications but poor enforcement); 
5. ‘Both: Convention to Combat Organized Crime’s Protocols on Smuggling 
and Trafficking (strong ratifications but focus on enforcement, not 
protection).’200 
In its October 2008 working paper201 the IASC describes how existing international 
legal frameworks may apply to populations affected by the impacts of climate 
change and environmental degradation as well as certain gaps that may exist. These 
legal frameworks are depicted in table 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
199 Own brackets, since existing international migration mechanisms are already referred to in 
section 4. 
200 Martin op cit n 198 at 8. 
201 IASC October 2008 Working Paper op cit n 107. 
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Table 3: Existing international legal frameworks and the possible application 
thereof 
Source: Informal group on migration/ displacement and climate change of the Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC) ‘Climate change, migration and displacement, who will be 
affected?’ (31 October 2008)202 
 
Cause of movement Nature of Movement Existing Legal 
framework 
(a) Hydro-meteorological 
extreme hazard events 
Temporary forced 
displacement as a result 
of a specific hazard event 
within national borders 
Temporary forced 
displacement across 
international borders as a 
result of a specific hazard 
event 
Temporary voluntary 
movement across 
international borders as a 
result of a specific hazard 
event 
Forced displacement as a 
result of areas being 
designated as prohibited 
for habitation by 
authorities potentially 
resulting in internal 
displacement, forced 
cross-border movements 
and/or voluntary cross  - 
border movement.  
Those moving within 
existing borders are 
currently protected by 
 international human 
rights law if they 
move voluntarily; 
 international human 
rights law and the 
Guiding Principles 
on internal 
displacement if they 
are forcibly 
displaced. 
Those moving across 
international borders: 
Potential gap 1: Those 
moving across 
international borders as 
a result of hazard events 
(and subsequent 
designation of prohibited 
areas) are protected by 
international human 
rights law, which, 
                                                  
202 Table available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/smsn/igo/022.pdf accessed on 1 February 
2014.  
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however, does not entitle 
them to admission and 
stay in another country. 
They are not 
automatically protected 
by the 1951 refugee 
convention, unless they 
meet established criteria. 
In some cases, they 
might be in need of 
protection and assistance 
temporarily pending 
return. More analysis is 
necessary to determine if 
some may be covered by 
existing regional 
convention regardless of 
their formal status  
(b) Environmental 
degradation and/or 
slow onset extreme 
hazard events 
Such process will likely 
be gradual, beginning 
with voluntary 
movements (in-and 
outside the country) and 
potentially ending in 
forced displacement (in-
and outside the country). 
Environmental 
degradation whether at 
early or advanced stages 
and/or slow onset 
disasters may also result 
in areas being prohibited 
for habitation by 
Those moving within 
existing borders are 
currently protected by 
 international human 
rights law if they 
move voluntarily; 
 international human 
rights law and the 
Guiding Principles 
on internal 
displacement if they 
are forcibly 
displaced. 
Potential gap 1: Those 
moving across 
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authorities leading to 
internal displacement, 
forced cross-border 
movements and/or 
voluntary cross-border 
movements (see above)  
international borders 
(see above) 
Potential gap 2: There is 
a lack of criteria to 
distinguish between 
voluntary and forced 
movements in hazard 
related disaster settings.  
(c) Significant permanent 
losses in state territory 
as a result of sea level 
rise etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Such process if not 
prevented by sufficient 
mitigation, could be 
gradual, beginning with 
voluntary movements (in-
and outside the country) 
and potentially ending in 
forced displacement (in-
and outside the country). 
These could also include: 
 voluntary movements 
inside the country (to 
safer parts of the 
country) and across 
internationally 
recognized borders 
 displacement within 
the national territory 
 forced cross-border 
movements, including 
in extreme cases the 
entire loss of territory.  
Those moving within 
existing borders are 
currently protected by 
 international human 
rights law if they 
move voluntarily; 
 international human 
rights law and the 
Guiding Principles 
on internal 
displacement if they 
are forcibly 
displaced. 
Potential gaps 1 & 2 (see 
above) 
Potential gap 3: Should a 
state lose its entire 
territory, one of the 
constituent elements of 
statehood, it is not clear 
whether its statehood 
would continue to be 
recognised by the 
international 
community. There is a 
    50 
risk that its population 
would be rendered 
stateless. While UNHCR 
has a mandate for the 
prevention of 
statelessness and the 
protection of stateless 
persons, specific 
arrangements will need 
to be forged which 
permit for the movement 
elsewhere and prevent 
statelessness.  
(d) Armed 
conflict/violence over 
shrinking natural 
resources 
Forced displacement in 
the case of such armed 
conflict or violence could 
result internal 
displacement or in people 
crossing international 
borders as refugees or 
persons under temporary 
or subsidiary forms of 
protection. 
Those moving within 
existing borders are 
currently protected by: 
 International 
humanitarian law 
(IHL) 
 International human 
rights law 
 The Guiding 
Principles on 
Internal 
Displacement 
Those moving across 
international borders 
could be protected by 
 International 
humanitarian law 
(IHL) 
 International human 
rights law 
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 International refugee 
law 
 Subsidiary and 
temporary protection 
regimes for persons 
fleeing from or 
displaced by armed 
conflicts.  
 
 
The above highlights the fact that under international law, all human beings are 
entitled to the full enjoyment of human rights, including the right to relocate, but it 
also indicates the differentiation that is made between those who move voluntarily 
and those displaced with force.  
There are various instruments that may or may not have application in certain 
instances, but there is one potential gap that stands out: ‘those moving across 
international borders.’ 
II.   THE GAP IN INTERNATIONAL LAW    
While most movement will be internal203 and may well fall within existing 
migration frameworks, it is evident there is no familiar mould to protect those 
forced to leave their homes and cross borders where loss of entire territories will 
occur. Reference is often made to this situation as the ‘gap’ that seems to exist in 
international law in that there is no hard and fast rule or legislation that can be used 
to address this issue.  On 3 June 2009, the UNGA requested the UN Secretary to 
submit a report204 on the possible security of implications of climate change. This 
report highlighted that cross-border displacement causes gaps in international 
law.205 During the High Commissioner’s Dialogue on Protection Challenges the 
cross-border displacement as a result of the effects of climate change as well as 
                                                  
203 McAdam Swimming Against the Tide 2011 op cit n 16 at 21.  
204 Report of the Secretary op cit n 175. Discussed in Chapter 3. Note that as of 2012 the Security 
council has not yet addressed climate change in a resolution   
205 Kälin & Schrepfer op cit n 4 at 51.  
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natural disasters, was identified as a ‘normative gap in the international protection 
regime.’206  
National immigration laws restrict the entry of non-citizens into other 
countries. International law places an obligation on states to protect certain people 
who have been forcibly displaced – for instance, ‘refugees’ and ‘stateless 
persons’207 – but, unless people migrate voluntarily for lawful reasons, or fall 
within one of the forced displacement groups, they are not automatically protected 
by international law.  The mere existence of international human rights law does 
not mean automatic entitlement to admission and permanent stay in a third country.  
The most important distinguishing factor in this instance is the fact that most 
people have not left their homes yet. If nothing is done they may one day find 
themselves in a situation knocking at the border gates of foreign countries, seeking 
protection perhaps even claiming to be refugees.  
(a) Applicability of the 1951 Refugee Convention  
 
The possibility of applying the Refugee Convention has been debated and 
abandoned in various papers.208  A refugee is not someone who is contemplating 
leaving his or her country of origin at a future date, it is someone who is already 
outside his or her country of origin. Also, his or her government is unable or not 
willing to protect such person and he or she as a well-founded fear of persecution 
that is based on account of his or her: 
• race, 
• religion, 
• nationality, 
• political opinion or 
• membership of a particular social group.209 
                                                  
206  High Commissioner’s Dialogue on Protection Challenges. Breakout Session 1 (8-9 December 
2010). ‘Gaps in the International Protection Framewok and in Its Implementation, “Protection Gaps 
and Responses”’ Report by the Co-Chairs available at http://www.unhcr.org/4d09e47a9.pdf 
accessed on 9 February 2014 at 3. 
207  McAdam 2011 Complementary Protection Standards op cit n 7 at 4.  
208 See Söderberg, Carl. ‘Human Rights in a Warmer World: The Case of Climate Change 
Displacement’ (2011) LUP working paper no. 2011-01-28 Lund University Publications  
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1749357 accessed on 11 January 
2013 for more information on the possible application of the 1951 Convention.  
209 Refugee Convention Art 1A(2); McAdam 2009 at op cit n 21 at 12.  
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Within the current ambit of the Refugee Convention ‘environment’ is not listed as 
grounds on which a person can base his or her well-founded fear. Another 
important aspect about the Refugee Convention that is that of the relationship and 
trust between a national and his or her own government. Within the context of the 
Refugee Convention, this trust is destroyed by a national’s own government, 
leaving such a person with a ‘well-founded’ fear that he or she will not receive the 
necessary protection from his government.  Within the context of climate change, 
one cannot make the assumption that the governments of countries suffering from 
the impacts of climate change are not able or willing to protect their citizens.210  
Several attempts have been made by individuals to seek protection within 
the ambit of the Refugee Convention by claiming to be climate refugees. Recently a 
Pacific islander from Kiribati argued that he has grounds to be considered as a 
climate change refugee. Claiming that climate change was slowly destroying his 
low-lying home, Ioane Teitiota211 argued that he and his family should not be 
reported from New Zealand despite the fact that his visa expired. The High Court 
handed down judgement in which Judge John Priestly acknowledged, ‘Kiribati was 
suffering environmental degradation attributable to climate change, including storm 
surges, flooding and contaminated water’ but that Teitiota did not meet the criteria 
of the Refugee Convention of fearing persecution if they return home and that the 
attempt to expand the scope of the Refugee Convention is impermissible.212 In his 
decision the judge rejected the argument that Teitiota was ‘persecuted passively’ by 
the environment, claiming that climate change is a threat and like other 
governments the Kiribati government was powerless to control it. The judge 
delivered a stern warning about the future:  ‘On a broad level, were they to succeed 
and be adopted in other jurisdictions, at a stroke, millions of people who are facing 
medium-term economic deprivation, or the immediate consequences of natural 
disasters or warfare, or indeed presumptive hardships caused by climate change, 
would be entitled to protection under the Refugee Convention.’  The judge also 
                                                  
210 Kälin op cit n 39 at 88.  
211 Teitiota and his wife moved to New Zealand in 2007, where their 3 children were born. The 
family stayed illegally in the country and for this reason the children are not recognised as citizens 
since they are the offspring of illegals born in the country acc 
http://reliefweb.int/report/kiribati/pacific-islander-fails-bid-be-first-climate-refugee accessed on 14 
December 2013.   
212 Ioane Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment (2013) 
NZHC 3125 (judgement of 26 November 2013); para 63. 
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made reference to similar claims213 and stressed that it is ‘not for the High Court of 
New Zealand to alter the scope of the Refugee Convention in this regard.’ 
In short, within the context of human movement as a response to the impacts 
of climate change, and in particular the fact that homes may become uninhabitable, 
persons or families may chose voluntary migration as an individual adaptation 
response. However international law does not provide a ‘general entitlement to be 
admitted to another country’ except under refugee law and the principle of non-
refoulement214 that prohibits states from sending people back to places where they 
risk being ‘tortured, exposed to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, or 
subjected to the death penalty or arbitrary deprivation of life.’215  Thus, unless a 
person meets established criteria the 1951 Refugee Convention does not 
automatically protect him or her. 216   
(b) Relevance of differentiation between voluntary and forced movement  
 
The differentiation between voluntary and forced movement is also important in 
order to determine which normative framework might be applicable. There are no 
clear criteria to distinguish between voluntary and forced movements, complicating 
the situation more. Often the ‘prevailing circumstances’ and the ‘particular 
vulnerabilities of the people concerned’ are used as points of departure in order to 
determine whether it would be appropriate to ask of them to return to their original 
homes.217 It is then argued that this ought to be analyzed on the basis of the 
following elements: ‘permissibility, factual possibility and reasonableness of 
return.’218   
Where people move voluntarily because of environmental degradation 
within existing borders, then existing international human rights law applies. If 
movement is within existing borders but forced displacement then both 
international human rights law and the Guiding Principles on Internal 
                                                  
213 People from countries such as Tonga, Fiji and Bangladesh also unsuccessfully made similar 
claims under international law for climate change refugee status 
(http://reliefweb.int/report/kiribati/pacific-islander-fails-bid-be-first-climate-refugee)  
214 Kälin op cit n 39 at 95. 
215 McAdam 2009 op cit n 21 at 18.  
216 More analysis is necessary to determine if some may be covered by existing regional convention 
regardless of their formal status. Also see Table 3.  
217 Kälin op cit n 39 at 95.  
218 Ibid.  
    55 
Displacement219 apply. This also applies when, as a result of sea level rise, 
significant permanent losses in state territory arise - as long as the movement is 
voluntary and within existing borders.  In addition, the recently accepted Peninsula 
Principles on Climate Change Displacement220 are relevant and applies to those 
displaced within the borders of their own country as a result of the impacts of 
climate change. Where armed conflict or violence result over diminishing natural 
resources then those moving within existing borders are protected by International 
humanitarian law, international human rights law as well as the Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement. In this instance, those crossing borders as a result of 
conflict or violence can seek refuge in international humanitarian law, international 
human rights law, international refugee law and ‘subsidiary and temporary 
protection regimes for persons fleeing from or displaced by armed conflicts.’221   
In this instance, there is no factual possibility of return and while it is 
acknowledged that some might choose to move voluntarily, as a result of a 
combination of migration drivers, a big part of the population will ultimately be 
forced to leave their island of origin and move across borders, a situation that may 
well not have been had it not been for sea-level rise.  
(c)  Applicability of The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
 
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement is a soft law instrument that 
provides a framework for addressing displacement that occurs within a country. It 
is a ‘synthesis of international refugee law, humanitarian law and human rights law 
as applied in the context of internal displacement.’222 While these principles are 
relevant to the majority of people displaced as a result of environmental drivers and 
                                                  
219Although the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement is non-binding soft law they are 
considered customary international law.   
220 Peninsula Principles op cit n 101.  
221 Representative of the Secretary General on the human rights of internally displaced persons 
‘Displacement caused by the effects of climate change: Who will be affected and what are the gaps 
in the normative frameworks for their protection?’ (10 October 2008) Background paper  
available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/Submissions/DisplacementandCC_101020
08.pdf accessed on 10 September 2012 at 6.  
222 Kolmannskrog,Vikram. 'Climate change, environmental displacement and international 
law' (2012) J.Int. Dev 24 1071 at 1072.  
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impacts of climate change, they do not answer the situation relating to those that 
will be forced to cross borders as a result of the impact of climate change.  
(d)   Applicability of The Peninsula Principles on Climate Change Displacement 
within States 
The newly adopted Peninsula Principles are welcomed but they do not address 
‘climate change displacement’ that does not take place within borders. The process 
behind adopting these new set of principles may well serve as future guidance for a 
similar framework to address the issue of those forced to cross international borders 
as a result of sea-level rise.   
 
 
 
    57 
CHAPTER 5: DEVELOPING AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME FOR 
CLIMATE CHANGE DISPLACED PERSONS 
 
‘For citizens of sinking island states permanent solutions on the territory of other 
states must be found.’223 Walter Kälin 
I.   TOWARDS A SOLUTION 
It is likely that in the future certain types of human mobility outcomes will be 
caused by environmental change interacting with other migration drivers. It is also 
likely that the impact of policies aimed to ‘limit or slow the rate of environmental 
change on migration may be limited or unpredictable’.224  
Various policy responses have been designed and implemented over the 
years to assist countries with coping with the impacts of climate change. The 
Foresight report gives examples of such policies to reduce the need for migration 
influenced by environmental change relevant to inter alia low-elevation coastal 
zones,225 but in some instances even the best-designed policy will not be sufficient 
to prevent movement. While it has been established that international law principles 
may be applicable in some instances, they are still fragmented, as are institutional 
responses. It is indisputable that there will be new flows of displaced persons that 
need to be managed.226 It is important to fully understand the mobility outcomes 
resulting from environmental change, as well as the links between them, in order to 
make policy decisions.227  
In the process of developing suitable policy options states ought to consider 
their various obligations that result from their signing of the UNFCCC, and 
incorporate all possible challenges in their future decision-making.228 The 
challenges associated with responding to displacement as a result of the impacts of 
climate change range from addressing the financial, operational and legal capacities 
                                                  
223 op cit n 221. 
224 Foresight Report op cit n 3 at 133, The Foresight Report also highlights and discuss the 
importance of including the promotion of long-term resilience to environmental change at 142.   
225 Foresight Report op cit n 3 at 135.  
226 McAdam 2011 Oxford op cit n152 at 236.  
227 Foresight Report op cit n 3 at 107, The Foresight Report also provides a figure setting out the six 
human mobility outcomes arising from environmental change and the links between them at 109, 
figure 4.1.  
228 Kälin op cit n 39 at 82.  
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to dealing with this type of human mobility. These challenges ‘exist at three 
levels’:229  
a) Addressing the cause: Mitigating climate change 
b) Addressing the effects: Reducing risks created by climate change and 
vulnerabilities caused by it 
c) Addressing the consequences: Protecting and assisting individuals displaced 
by the effects of climate change  
While options A and B are valid, the only option that is truly left for those living on 
small islands states is option C:230 To address the consequences of climate change, 
and in this instance, to protect and assist those impacted by rising sea-levels.  
From the outset of this paper it has been mentioned that migration as a result 
of environmental change is not a new phenomenon. The same applies to 
displacement as a result of environmental factors.  Floods, hurricanes and typhoons 
are examples of natural disasters that displace people, either temporarily or 
permanently. The disaster management legislation of most countries includes 
provisions pertaining to the necessary assistance and protection for those affected 
by natural disasters in their home country.231 Based on humanitarian grounds, and 
not because there is a specific policy or legal instrument in place, certain states 
have ‘admitted and received’ people displaced across borders in their territories as a 
‘temporary measure on a very ad hoc basis.’232 Also on a domestic level some 
states have implemented systems of ‘temporary or subsidiary protection for 
disaster-induced cross border displaced persons’233 – providing some temporary 
relief to this gap. However, it has been shown that there is no permanent solution 
for those living on small island states, displaced because of sea level rise and 
ultimately forced to cross borders. Despite the lack of permanent solutions, various 
                                                  
229 Ibid.   
230 Kälin op cit n 39 at 83 ‘Mitigation and ex ante adaptation measures are often insufficient to 
prevent individuals from becoming displaced or otherwise being affected by the negative 
consequences of climate change.’  
231 Kälin & Schrepfer op cit n 4 at 45.  
232 Ibid.  
233Ibid. The Nansen Conference, Chairperson’s Summary, para 22 makes similar mention of 
measures taken available at http://pnc.iucnp.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Chairpersons-
Summary-Nansen-Conference-on-Climate-Change-and-Displacement.pdf accessed on 3 January 
2014. Also see general Kälin & Schrepfer op cit n 4 for lists examples of some temporary protection 
measures.  
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initiatives have been undertaken to pave the way towards a solution to assist those 
crossing borders as a result of climate change. 
II. SOFT LAW AND THE NANSEN INITIATIVE THAT MAKES SPECIFIC 
REFERENCE TO SMALL ISLAND STATES, THREATENED BY SEA-
LEVEL RISE 
On 21 October 1989 the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting adopted 
the Langkawi Declaration on the Environment234 expressing concern over 
permanent and irreversible damage as a result of the serious deterioration in the 
environment. Specific mention is made of islands and low-lying countries that are 
threatened by sea-level rise.235 In the Langkawi Declaration, the Heads of 
Government of the Commonwealth resolved to act collectively and individually and 
to commit themselves to a programme of action that includes inter alia 
‘support [for] low-lying and island countries in their efforts to protect themselves 
and their vulnerable natural marine ecosystems from the effects of sea level rise’ 
The Small States Conference on Sea Level Rise was held at Male, Maldives, from 
14 to 18 November 1989 where the Male Declaration on Global Warming and Sea 
Level Rise236 was adopted. This declaration describes the predicament of low-lying, 
small, coastal and island States and expressed the fact that their survival was 
threatened. The declaration states specifically that an ‘effective international 
strategy for the small States of the World to cope with those impacts should be 
agreed upon as a separate issue within a global strategy.’   
The 2004 Otin Taai Declaration237 also acknowledges how Pacific island 
countries will be significantly affected by anthropogenic climate change.238  On 20 
August 2008 the Niue Declaration on Climate Change239 was adopted, and the 
‘climate witnesses’ of the coastal region of Bangladesh expressed their concerns 
                                                  
234Langkawi Declaration on the Environment (adopted 21 October 1989) available at 
http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/news-items/documents/Langkawi-declaration.pdf 
accessed on 18 January 2014. 
235 Langkawi Declaration on the Environment op cit n 234 para 3. 
236 Male Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change (adopted 14 November 
2007)available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Male_Declaration_Nov07.pdf accessed on 18 
January 2014 
237 See Chapter 1. 
238 McAdam Swimming Against the Tide 2011 op cit n 16 at 7.   
239 Niue Declaration on Climate Change, 39th Pacific Islands Forum, Forum Communiqué, Annex B 
(adopted 20 August 2009)  
available at http://www.pacificdisaster.net/m/show_article.jsp?id=9458 accessed on 1 March 2013 
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over the lives and livelihoods of the coastal people of Bangladesh and how it is 
being impacted by ‘frequent depression in the sea, storm, cyclone and tidal surges’ 
making specific recommendations of their views on what ought to be done.240 More 
recently, the 2011 Nansen Conference on Climate Change led to the Nansen 
Initiative launched by Norway and Switzerland on 2 October 2012.  Addressing the 
‘need for a more coherent and consistent approach to the protection of people 
displaced externally, ie across national borders, including but not limited to people 
whose movements are triggered by climate change’241 this initiative is an important 
step in the right direction. As an overall goal, it aims to build consensus on 
principles and elements that are key to the protection of those displaced across 
borders and to set the agenda for future action at all levels, domestic, regional and 
international.242 
What the proposals are trying to clarify is the duty of states to assist those 
affected by the impacts of climate change – in this instance those who are 
displaced. 
III.    PROPOSALS MADE FOR A LEGAL REGIME  
Chapter 4 has shown that currently there is no legal instrument that deals 
specifically with the issue of those displaced as a result of climate change, and that 
international law recognizes only a small class of people as forced migrants, people 
whom other countries have an obligation to protect. Without a normative 
framework, some may therefore not have legal protection when they are forced to 
move. Table 4 lists a selection of the various proposals that have been made so far 
for a new instrument to address the issue of those displaced by climate change.243  
Most proposals try to address the rights gap and the funding gap.244For the purpose 
of this paper, focus is only placed on the rights gap.   
 
                                                  
240 Shaheed Hadis Park, Bangladesh. Posted on Save the Coastlines on 14 November 2009  
available at http://savethecoastlines.blogspot.com/2010/01/climate-change-vioce-of-victims-
from.html accessed on 2 February 2014.  
241 Submission to UNFCCC SBI op cit n 78 at 3.    
242 Ibid.  
243 This table is compiled mostly from the various proposals listed in McAdam Oxford 2011 op cit n 
152 at 190; McAdam 2011 Swimming against the tide op cit n 16 at 4; McAdam 2011 
Complementary protection standards op cit n 7 at 55; Hodgkinson op cit n 69 at 6 and McAnaney, 
Sheila. ‘Formulating a realistic solution to climate change displacement’ (2012) 87 New York 
University Law Review 1172 -1209 at 6. 
244 McAnaney op cit n 243 at 6.   
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Table 4: Summary of proposals made 
 
 Proposal made by Date Proposal 
1.  Maldives, at state level 2006 Proposed amending the 
Refugee Convention245 to 
extend the definition of a 
refugee in Article 1 A(2) to 
include ‘climate refugees’ 
2.  Sujatha Byravan & Sudhir 
Chella Rajan 
 
 
2006 Propose a ‘new global 
convention to establish special 
migration status for climate 
exiles and migrants.’246 
Protection under this proposal 
is limited to those ‘living on 
small islands and along coasts 
in low-lying countries whose 
habitats and means of 
livelihood have been destroyed 
by climate impacts.’  
3.  Environmental Justice 
Foundation 
2009  Proposed the international 
community to initiate 
negotiations for a new legally-
binding agreement on climate 
change refugees. This new 
legal framework (either under 
the UNFCCC or a stand – 
                                                  
245 Similar proposal was proposed by others inter alia Cooper, J.B: Environmental Refugees: 
Meeting the Requirements of the Refugee Definition – in this work it was proposed that under the 
Refugee Convention displaced persons were to be granted ‘refugee’ status.  
246 See McAnaney op cit n 243 at 6; Byravan, Sujatha., Rajan Sudhir., ‘Providing New Homes for 
Climate Change Exiles’ 2006,  
available at 
 http://cdf.ifmr.ac.in/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/CP_6_2_07_Byravan_247-252.pdf accessed on 
March 2012  
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alone convention) must build 
on existing mechanisms.247 
4.  Scholars: Docherty and 
Giannini  
2009 
‘Confrontin
g a rising 
tide:  
A proposal 
for a 
Convention 
on Climate 
Change 
Refugees’ 
Proposed an ‘independent’ or 
‘stand-alone’ convention 
defining the term ‘climate 
change refugee’ and containing 
‘guarantees of assistance, 
shared responsibility, and 
administration.’ Also, it is 
suggested that protected status 
are granted to people who have 
to leave their home countries 
‘as the result of sudden or 
gradual environmental 
disruption that is consistent 
with climate change and to 
which humans more likely than 
not contributed.’248 
5.  Equity and Justice Working 
Group Bangladesh 
(EquityBD) A Bangladeshi  
NGO 
April 2009 Called for a new protocol to 
the UNFCCC to ensure social, 
cultural and economic 
rehabilitation of the ‘climate 
refugees’ through recognizing 
them as ‘Universal Natural 
Persons’249 
                                                                                                                                         
247  Environmental Justice Foundation ‘ No Place Like Home - Where Next For Climate Refugees’ 
2009, Available at 
http://ejfoundation.org/sites/default/files/public/no%20place%20like%20home.pdf accessed on 19 
November 2013.  
248 Docherty, Bonnie., Giannini, Tyler ‘Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on 
Climate Change Refugees’ 2009, available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/elr/vol33_2/Docherty%20Giannini.pdf accessed on 4 
December 2013 at 361. 
249 Shamsuddoha, M.;Chowdhury, R.K ‘Climate change induced forced migrants: in need of 
dignified recognition under a new Protocol’ 2009 available at 
http://www.glogov.org/images/doc/equitybd.pdf accessed on 1 February 2014  
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6.  Bangladeshi Finance 
Minister 
December 
2009 
‘The convention on refugees 
could be revised to protect 
people. It has been through 
other revisions, so this could be 
possible.’ 
7.  
 
Scholars: Biermann and 
Boas 
February 
2010 
UNFCCC Protocol on the 
Recognition, Protection, and 
Resettlement of Climate 
Refugees250 
8.  Group of scholars from the 
University of Limoges 
May 2010  Published a Draft Convention 
on the International Status of 
Environmentally –Displaced 
Persons251 
September 
2010  
Proposed a joint South Asian 
initiative to mobilize 
international support under the 
UNFCCC to ensure the social, 
cultural, and economic 
rehabilitation of climate 
change-induced displaced 
people 
9.  Bangladeshi Prime Minister, 
Sheikh Hasina 
April 2011 Calling for ‘the establishment 
of an international regime 
under the UN to tackle the 
situation.’ 
                                                  
250 Biermann, Frank., Boas, Ingrad., ‘Preparing for a warmer world: Towards a Global Governance 
System to Protect Climate Refugees’  (2010) Global Environmental Politics, Volume 10, Number 1. 
60-88  Also available at: 
 http://www.acpmigration-obs.org/sites/default/files/Biermann%20-
%20Preparing%20for%20a%20warmer%20world.pdf 
251 Draft Convention on the International status of environmentally – displaced persons, second 
version (May 2010) Available at 
http://www.cidce.org/pdf/Draft%20Convention%20on%20the%20International%20Status%20on%2
0environmentally%20displaced%20persons%20(second%20version).pdf accessed on 4 January 
2014. 
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10.  Scholars: Byravan and 
Chella Rajan 
 Raised the prospect of a treaty 
creating ‘climate exile’ status, 
giving people in ‘physically 
unviable’ States the ‘right to 
migrate to a particular or 
previously agreed upon 
country’. 
11.  Australian based project:  A 
Convention for Climate 
Change Displaced Persons.   
 Seeks to elaborate ‘a draft 
convention for persons 
displaced by climate change’, 
which would establish an 
international regime for the 
status and treatment of such 
persons. 
12.  Council of Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly’s 
Committee on Migration, 
Refugees and Population  
 Suggested ‘adding an 
additional protocol to the 
European Convention on 
Human Rights, concerning the 
right to a healthy and safe 
environment as a way of 
enhancing the human rights 
protection mechanisms vis-à-
vis the challenges of climate 
change and environmental 
degradation processes.’ 
13.  Austrian –based study 
(Margit Ammer and others)  
 Focusing on the ‘development 
of a comprehensive 
international treaty with a 
strong focus on responsibility-
sharing mechanisms, as well as 
a guaranteed legal status for 
the displaced’. 
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McAdam points out the underlying basis of these proposals: ‘[P]resumably, to 
provide a rights-based framework for people to move when the impacts of climate 
change render life and livelihoods at home impossible.’252 She also points out that 
they differ in defining those displaced and in determining status: Would protection 
be provided based on ‘individual status determination’ or would it be granted prima 
facie based on the conditions of the country from where people are displaced? 
Hodgkinson and Young also point out that most proposals agree that the scope of 
the existing refugee regime under the 1951 Refugee Convention does not cover 
those displaced as a result of the impacts of climate change.253  This is where the 
conversation moves to the idea of a convention as a possible solution.   
(a) Arguments made supporting a convention 
Advocates of a stand-alone convention are of the opinion that a new convention, 
addressing displacement as a result of the impacts of climate change, will 
compliment existing international law. In particular it will compliment refugee law 
that has proven to provide inadequate assistance and protection to those displaced 
as a result of the impacts of climate change.254 The fact that the issue of 
displacement is not included in either the UNFCCC process or its Kyoto Protocol is 
also raised as an argument as to why a new legal instrument is necessary to address 
the limitations of these existing frameworks.255 It is also argued that the issue of 
displacement as a result of the impact of climate change is ‘sufficiently new 
and substantial' to justify its own legal regime and that it should not be ‘forced 
within legal frameworks that were not designed to handle it’.256 It is further argued 
that no ‘coherent multilateral governance framework’257 exists and that an 
independent convention can be ‘creatively tailored to the complexity of the problem 
and to take a broad based and integrated approach’ and that negotiations for such a 
new convention ‘could break out of the traditional state-to-state mould and involve 
communities and civil society.’258 The lack of comprehensive proposals to address 
                                                  
252 McAdam 2011 Oxford op cit n 152 at 192.  
253 Hodgkinson op cit n 15 at 6; Note that there are exceptional circumstances where the Refugee 
Convention may apply.  
254 Docherty & Giannini 248 at 2. 
255 Hodgkinson op cit n 15. 
256 Docherty & Giannini op cit n 248 at 350. 
257 Hodgkinson op cit n 15 at 7; Similar argument in Docherty & Giannini op cit n 248 at 7. 
258 Docherty & Giannini op cit n 248 at 2.  
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the problem of those displaced as a result of climate change is also raised as part of 
an argument to strengthen the case for a convention.259 Those proposing a 
convention also often refer to the scale and nature of the problem to add weight to 
their argument.260  
(b) Why a convention is not the best solution  
When existing international law do not provide normative answers to a specific 
issue then a new legal instrument, negotiated by the international community, can 
fill the void.261 However, adopting negotiating text is a long process that requires 
considerable compromise.262 The issues under negotiation as part of the UNFCCC 
process are known for their complexity, and the entire process serves as an 
illustration of the amount of time needed and political battlefield nature of working 
towards such a compromise. This process is further prolonged because, often, 
linguistic detail slows down the climate change discussion rather than substance.263  
It has been illustrated that movement and/or displacement as a result of the impacts 
of climate change is a result of a combination of drivers with ‘spatially and socially 
differentiated’264 impacts on human movement. To successfully negotiate an 
instrument of compromise caution needs to be paid to stay clear from an instrument 
that may be generally ‘too vague, and which cannot be translated into practical, 
rational policies and normative frameworks’.265 For this reason it is argued that 
guiding principles may be a more appropriate solution.266 
The various forms of movement and the accompanying complexity has also 
been discussed as well as the need to often place legal questions into specific boxes. 
Mc Adam heeds caution ‘against squeezing all forms of ‘forced’ movement into a 
protection paradigm – responses would be better achieved by focusing on states’ 
burden – sharing obligations to each other, and their responsibility to the 
international community as a whole.’267   
                                                  
259 Hodgkinson op cit n 15 at 6.  
260 Hodgkinson op cit n 15 at 2. 
261 Kälin & Schrepfer op cit n 4 at 69- 70.  
262 McAdam Swimming Against the Tide 2011 op cit n 16 at 4. 
263 McAdam Swimming Against the Tide 2011 op cit n 16 at 4 &10.  
264 McAdam Swimming Against the Tide 2011  op cit n 16 at 10. 
265 McAdam Swimming Against the Tide 2011  op cit n 16 at 21. 
266 McAdam Swimming Against the Tide 2011 op cit n 16 at 10. 
267 McAdam Swimming Against the Tide 2011 op cit n 16 at 22. 
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I agree that a treaty should be viewed as ‘one of a number of mechanisms 
that may respond to climate-induced displacement, rather than as the solution.’268  
Another important argument is that most movement will be internal and that the 
Guiding Principles and the new Peninsula Principles will apply in these instances. 
Yet, the particular type of movement caused by sea-level rise is not covered by 
these sets of principles. 
While it seems almost impossible to negotiate an international response that 
will provide and account for all the different types of movement and interests of 
various States, the answer might lie in the development of regional soft-law to act 
as a guiding framework. The Niue-Declaration on Climate Change for instance will 
provide a ‘more effective springboard for developing responses, than will a new 
international instrument aiming to take into account the interests of all states in a 
wide variety of contexts’.269 Clear frameworks also already exist at the normative 
level, the most relevant and important being the human rights law regime that can 
further guide actions.270 While the UNFCCC was drafted with the aim to mitigate 
climate change, it does not mean that the surrounding process did not develop in a 
manner to include different elements. Over the years, various work programs and 
bodies were established to address emerging issues coupled with climate change, 
broadening the response of the UNFCCC beyond mitigation and adaptation. 
III. THE ROLE OF THE UNFCCC   
At the time of the initial negotiations of the UNFCCC it was hoped that mitigation 
would be the answer to the world’s changing climate problem. Adaptation as a 
response measure only started flourishing much later at the 13th Conference of the 
Parties (COP 13) held in Bali, Indonesia 2007. Even more so migration as an 
ultimate adaptation response to climate change was most certainly not discussed at 
the first COP, in fact it was only much later that migration and displacement made 
their way into the UNFCCC process.271  
                                                  
268 McAdam Swimming Against the Tide 2011 op cit n 16 at 6.  
269 McAdam Swimming Against the Tide 2011 op cit n 16 at 22. 
270 Ibid. 
271 Warner, Koko ‘Migration and Displacement in the Context of Adaptation to Climate Change: 
Development in the UNFCCC Climate Negotiations and Potential for Future Action’ 2011 available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/4df9cc309.pdf accessed on 10 January 2014 at 7. 
    68 
Adopted at COP 13, the Bali Road Map included the Bali Action Plan272 laying out 
the elements of adaptation to be considered in future agreements. 273 Migration was 
mentioned for the first time in the assembly document that was compiled from 
submissions received from COP 13 to 30 September 2008.274 One of the many 
submissions that was included in the initial assembly text but that did not make its 
way to the negotiating text was a proposal made by the Alliance of Small Island 
States (AOSIS) for an international climate insurance facility, and the proposal 
made reference to ‘longer-term processes that might include population 
displacement’ if rigorous mitigation measures were not taken.275 During the second 
session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long –term Cooperative Action (AWG – 
LCA), Bangladesh presented a submission276 on behalf of the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) raising the issue of ‘compensation for climate victims/climate 
refugees’ suggestion a ‘mechanism for assessing loss and damage’ and ‘a financial 
mechanism towards addressing immediate owes of climate victims.’277 These 
suggestions may not have made their way into the draft negotiating text for COP 
14, 2008, but migration remained seen in the text. Academic literature also saw an 
increase of interest in the topic.  At the open plenary of the June 2009 Subsidiary 
Body meetings held in Bonn, Germany the head of the US delegation, Jonathan 
Pershing rightfully raised concern about the term ‘climate refugee’ being used in 
the draft text.278 Pershing’s recommendation was noted by the UNFCCC, and the 
wording around migration and displacement was revised and continued to find its 
way into the discussions from Bangkok and Barcelona 2009 to later that same year 
at COP 15 held in Copenhagen December 2009. Other than Pershing’s concern 
about the term used to address the issue, there is no public record of objections or 
concerns raised by Parties to the Convention about the inclusion of the issue in the 
                                                  
272 FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Decision 1/CP.13).  
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf#page=3 accessed on 1 
February 2014.  
273 Warner op cit n 271 at 7.  
274 Warner op cit n 271 at 8. 
275 Ibid.  
276 Presentation made by Bangladesh at Ad Hoc Working Group session on adaptation 
available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/application/pdf/bangladesh_awgcla2_adaptation_workshop.pdf 
accessed on 22 December 2013. 
277 Bangladesh op cit n 276 at 5.  
278 Warner op cit n 271 at 8. 
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UNFCCC negotiations text279, and as the world held its breath towards the COP 15 
negotiations, AWG – LCA delegates continued to work on elements of an 
adaptation framework that was broader and which included ‘migration and 
displacement.’280  Some member States suggested that a range of themes, including 
human rights, compensation to vulnerable people, climate justice etc are added to 
the paragraph on migration and displacement. There was a general concern that 
such inclusions would place a heavy burden on the paragraph, and by means of 
compromise most of these issues were places as principles in the preambular 
text.281The discussion resulted in the COP 15 outcome text282 to read:  
‘4. Invites all Parties to enhance adaptation action under the Copenhagen 
Adaptation Framework [for Implementation]283 taking into account their common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and specific national 
and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstance, [and whereby 
developing country Parties shall be supported by developed country Parties and in 
accordance with paragraph 6 below], to undertake, inter alia: 
.... 
(f) Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation related to 
national, regional and international climate change induced displacement, 
migration and planned relocation, where appropriate.’ 
This was the first time that the issue of migration and displacement made its way 
into the draft UNFCCC negotiation text, 2010, 18 years after the signing of the 
Convention. The subparagraph on migration and displacement was put in the 
context of the list of activities in paragraph 4 that could be seen as ‘adaptation’ and 
laid the basis to define an adaptation framework that was broad enough and that 
could guide future work.  Another important aspect of paragraph 4 is that it created 
a list of activities that ‘might qualify either for adaptation – related funding or that 
donors might interpret as ‘countable’ towards their commitments to help finance 
adaptation to climate change.’ 284  An important hypothesis is made by Warner, one 
that only ‘time will tell’ but he raises the point that because of the inclusion of this 
issue in the draft Copenhagen negotiating text it is ‘expected that governments and 
                                                  
279 Ibid.  
280 Ibid. 
281 Ibid.  
282 FCCC/CP/2010/2 available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/02.pdf 
283 The bracketed text was resisted.  
284 Warner op cit n 271 at 9. 
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other organisations could be more favourable to supporting activities for better 
understanding human mobility in the context of climate change.285 Warner also 
highlights the commitment made by industrialised countries to provide fast start 
finance of up to 30 billion USD by 2012 and 100 billion or more per year by 2020 
and concludes that an ‘inclusion of a subparagraph in this context signalled to 
donors that investment was needed around the knowledge base and exchange views 
on migration and displacement.’286 
From Copenhagen to Cancun the issue of migration and displacement was 
‘securely inside the ‘package’ of text where few brackets existed.’ Unchanged the 
text remained after Copenhagen287 until October 2010 when the adaptation text was 
briefly opened for discussion in Tianjin.288  The Cancun negotiations felt the 
pressure of the failed Copenhagen negotiations and pressure was mounting to create 
outcomes that would deliver concrete results, an outcome that was not too 
ambitious and that would restore faith in the UNFCCC process that was questioned. 
In light of this delegates focused on the elements to include in a possible Cancun 
Adaptation Framework. As their work progressed the migration text changed.  
The wording slightly changed by the Tianjin chair and to read: 
(f) Measure to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to 
climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where 
appropriate, at national, regional and international levels289  
These changes clarified the previous text in order not to give room for 
interpretation that there are ‘separate divisions or categories according to national, 
regional and international environmentally induced migrants.’290 The importance of 
the new wording lies in the fact that it makes decision makers aware of the different 
forms of migration and displacement and that it necessitates different policy 
approaches.291 Another important indication that the likelihood of a one-size fits all 
instrument is slim.  
                                                  
285 Warner op cit n 271 at 9. 
286 Ibid. 
287 Warner op cit n 271 at 10 & 11. The paragraph on adaptation did not change much between 
Copenhagen and Cancun mostly because the adaptation text was not open for discussion and or 
redrafting, as part of the strategy of Margaret Mukahanana – Sangarwe, the AWG-LCA chair.  
288 Warner op cit n 271 at 10. 
289 Warner op cit n 271 at 11. 
290 Ibid. 
291 Ibid.  
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The new wording also clearly sets out that coordination and cooperation that relates 
to migration and displacement could occur at all levels, national, regional and 
international.292   
Since making its first appearance in the UNFCCC draft negotiation text, the 
topic was referred to in several different ways. 
 
Table 5: Reference of migration and displacement in the UNFCCC process, field 
observations and high level meetings 293 
 
Date Document/ Conference Relevance  
1970  & 
1980  
 References to environmental 
change and migration 
appeared in some literature  
1990’s   More regular mentioning294 
1990 IPCC First assessment 
report  
Mentions environmentally 
induced migration  
2006 & 2007 IPCC Fourth assessment 
report 
Stern review and other key 
literature  
Migration and displacement 
mentioned in the report  
-other reports in the mid – to 
late 2000s295 
2007 COP 13 - Bali Through the activities of the 
                                                  
292 Ibid.  
293 Table compiled from information from Warner op cit n 271 at 11,12 & 21.  
294 Reference to Lonergan, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1999 in Warner op cit n 271 at 20-  
295 Massey, 2007; Kniveton et al., 2008; Jäger et al., 2009; Warner et al., (more articles listed at 
Warner op cit n 271 at 20)  
296 The Heads of Organizations of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is an inter-agency 
forum for human coordination and was established in June 1992 following a UN General Assembly 
Resolution (UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182) on the strengthening of humanitarian 
assistance. It involves key UN and non-UN humanitarian actors and is a policy development and 
decision making forum for its members. Wider participation was also coordinated by the IASC 
informal group on climate change and displacement and by various other UN and international and 
civil society organisations, including the Climate Action Network (CAN), that are concerned with 
migration and displacement. From 2008 onwards a constant flow of information on the topic was 
provided by these groups that coordinated side events, policy briefings, bilateral meetings with 
Parties and joint publications.  On 30 April 2009 IASC submitted a letter, the first to be signed by all 
organizational heads of the IASC, to the Yvo de Boer, the then Executive Secretary of the 
UNFCCC.  This letter expressed the desire to draw the attention of the UNFCCC parties to the 
human implications of climate change and calling for these implications to be acknowledge and 
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IASC296, the humanitarian 
community played a 
particular role  
 2007 
onwards  
Field observations  
Each – for project297 
And other projects298  
*in aug 2008 and at the 
Accra, Ghana session of the 
AWG -LCA the each – for 
and related research findings 
were first reported in a 
submission to the UNFCCC  
Each-for: research findings 
based on filed work in 23 
case studies worldwide299 
December 
2008 
Poznan, 
Poland  
Assembly text Referred to ‘migration and 
displacement’ 
2009 
onwards 
New developments  
E.g uk foresight project 
Various workshops300 and 
international conferences 
Including several workshops 
on migration and 
displacement  
Approval of new field 
research projects funded by 
governments and 
Helped to carry the message 
that migration and 
displacement were important 
topics for adaptation  
                                                                                                                                         
addressed in the successor of the Kyoto Protocol. In the letter the agencies reiterated that they are 
already actively responding to the consequences of climate change and it was the first of its kind, 
being signed by all organizational heads of the IASC.   
This networks also managed to establish regular communication with the UNFCCC secretariat   
297 EACH–FOR op cit n 27.   
298 For a list of other research projects see Koko Warner p 20 footnote 12.  
299 Warner notes that ‘research that delivered region – specific case studies and related analysis 
allowed decision makers to seethe relevance of the issue of their own country, further underscoring 
the relevance of including migration and displacement in the draft negotiating text. The research 
spiked interest, and then provided a basis of evidence to sustained that interest after COP 14 when 
the issue had already been included in the assembly text.’ See Warner op cit n 272 at 20.  
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foundations 
 
June 2009 AWG - LCA draft text Used term ‘climate refugees’ 
– objection was made by one 
party regarding this 
terminology  
December 
2009 
 
Outcome text of COP 15  
(fccc/cp/2010/2)  
Paragraph 4(f) 
‘climate change induced 
displacement, migration and 
planned relocation’ 
Reflected the understanding 
that ‘human mobility occurs 
on an adaptation continuum, 
and placed the issue within a 
larger adaptation 
framework.’301 
October 
2010 
Paragraph 4(f)  Text slightly changed and 
articulated  
Different kinds of measures 
(research, coordination, 
cooperation) 
Different types of mobility  
(displacement, migration, 
planned relocation) 
Different levels of mobility 
(national, regional, 
international) 
December 
2010 
COP 16  
Draft text accepted by 
Reflecting a more nuanced 
way  
                                                                                                                                         
300 The author attended the following international proceedings: Climate Change and Forced 
Migration side event – Bonn, UNFCCC meeting June 2009; Walter Kälin (SRSG) Opening address 
at Population Movement in context of climate change side event at 12th session of the Human 
Rights Council 16   September 2009; Presentation of draft Convention on environmentally displaced 
persons by Dr Jean – Pierre Marquénaud; 7th Gathering for Human Rights – Geneva 28 September 
2009 and Environmental Change and its impact on Human Societies – 9 Oct 2009. 
301 Warner op cit n 271 at 12. 
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parties,  
Paragraph 4 (f) of the 
Cancun adaptation 
agreement 
 
2013 High – level panel on 
climate change and 
migration at the global 
forum on migration and 
development  
 
2014 IPCC Fifth assessment 
report Working Group II 
Chapter 12 and regional 
chapters – particular mention 
of migration and 
displacement  
 
No provisions concerning specific assistance or protection for persons who will be 
directly affected by the impacts of climate change are included in either the 
UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol302 and addressing the issues of displacement is not 
contemplated in these instruments.303 While the topic receives a lot of attention in 
academic literature and surrounding issues such as definitions dominated academic 
discussion, paragraph 4(f) made its way into the Cancun Adaptation Framework 
with little resistance and no controversy. Receiving less political attention and 
being described as technical in nature304  
 However, the inclusion of paragraph 14(f) in the Cancun is a ‘modest but 
significant milestone in addressing climate change-related human mobility‘.305 
Human movement is now referenced within the wider context of enhancing 
national action on adaptation, but an obligation on how to turn ’enhanced 
”understanding, coordination and cooperation” into international strategies’ remains 
elusive.306  
 
                                                  
302  ISAC Oct 2008 Working Paper op cit n 201 at 1.   
303  Hodgkinson op cit n 15 at 5. 
304 Warner op cit n 271 at 17. 
305 Warner op cit n 271 at 28. 
306 McAdam Swimming Against the Tide 2011 op cit n 16 at 16.  
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Figure 2:307 A depiction of paragraph 14(f) 
 
 
Within the context of small island states being threatened by sea-level rise, 
‘planned relocation’ is the ultimate form of adaption. This type of human mobility 
falls within the context of paragraph 14(f). The next important steps are to 
determine the type of action needed, as well as the level at which this type of 
human mobility needs to be addressed. In addition to determine the type and level 
of action needed, it is important to identify the most suitable body to undertake this 
work. 
(a) Opportunities within the SBI Work Program on Loss & Damage  
At COP 16 and with the creation of the Cancun Adaptation Framework the 
UNFCCC’s SBI created a Work Program on Loss and Damage with three thematic 
areas.308 This work program is established to ‘consider, including through 
workshops and expert meetings, as appropriate to address loss and damage 
                                                  
307 Reproduced from Warner op cit n 10. 
308 Thematic area 1: Assessing the risk of loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of 
climate change and current knowledge on the same. Thematic area 2: A range of approaches to 
address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including impacts 
related to extreme weather events and slow onset events, taking into consideration experiences at all 
levels. Thematic area 3: The role of the Convention in enhancing implementation of approaches to 
address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change. 
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associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.’309 
It is envisaged that the work programme is an ongoing process of supporting 
implementation activities, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to 
the adverse effects of climate change, related to loss and damage associated with 
climate change impacts. The Cancun Adaptation Frameworks sets out the following 
three Work Program goals: 
• Advance understanding of and the reduction of loss and damage; 
• Promote the prevention and minimisation of loss and damage; 
• Provide a framework for activities that lead to the implementation of 
measures. 
These three goals also translate into the three thematic areas of the Work 
Programme:  
• Thematic area 1: Assessing the risk of loss and damage associated with the 
adverse effects of climate change and current knowledge on the same.  
• Thematic area 2: A range of approaches to address loss and damage 
associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including impacts 
related to extreme weather events and slow onset events, taking into 
consideration experiences at all levels.  
• Thematic area 3: The role of the Convention in enhancing implementation of 
approaches to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of 
climate change. 
In light of the arguments made that there is a clear gap in international law, that 
despite various initiatives there is no international body specifically mandated to 
address this issue and that a separate convention may not be the most appropriate 
answer – this paper argues that there is room within the SBI Work Program on Loss 
and Damage to facilitate and address the issue. 
There is a strong argument that losing the ability to live within the borders of 
one’s country, as a result of sea-level rise – one of the distinct impacts of climate 
change, is a ‘loss and damage’ associated with the impacts of climate change. The 
                                                  
309  Kreft, Sönke. ‘Addressing climate loss and damage, Agreeing on a work programme for action’ 
2013 available at http://www.lossanddamage.net/download/7011.pdf accessed on 20 December 2013 
at 3. 
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loss of territory is not the only ‘loss’ suffered. There is also the loss of living in 
close proximity to the land that you are connected to, the possible loss of specific 
traditions linked to your home island, the loss of certain food types, the inherent 
damage to family and society structures, to name only a few.  It is clear that further 
ways of understanding this particular loss and damage is needed, as well as ways to 
reduce it, if possible in any manner.  It is here where the inclusion of Article 14(f) 
creates an opportunity to ‘foster funding and initiatives’ to address the gaps by 
means of further research about one of the most pertinent migration drivers, 
environmental change and its impact on migration and displacement.310  Further 
and concluding work needs to be done in terms of agreeing on a definition of 
human movement that is linked to environmental change as a driver, the drivers in 
origin areas need to characterize (Warner lists examples: livelihood insecurity, 
environmental hazards, conflict, demographic pressures, gender inequality, etc.)311 
Therefore calling for more evidence based research. It has been discussed that 
various drivers influence the decision to move, and a better understanding is needed 
of the combination of factors. Within the context of sea-level rise initiatives are 
needed to further foster consultations with those most vulnerable to this particular 
climate change impact, namely affected communities. In its joint submission to the 
SBI312 the notion of the UNFCCC playing a role in filling the gaps is supported. It 
supports the idea that the Convention has a role to play in the ‘assessment of actual 
and potential human mobility linked to climatic stressors, with a loss and damage 
dimension. Various ways are suggested how the UNFCCC can assess loss and 
damage:313 
•  ‘The Convention, as well as Parties in their own national and regional 
contexts, can help fill the knowledge and evidence gaps by requesting 
targeted research and by collecting views and experiences that have not yet 
been made available (e.g., how pastoral communities have used migration to 
increase adaptive capacity). Requesting further evidence would also create a 
potential synergy between two related convention bodies (the SBI and 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice ‘SBSTA’) and 
                                                  
310 Warner op cit n 271 at 26. 
311 Warner op cit n 271 at 27. 
312 Oct 2012 Joint submission op cit n 78. 
313 Oct 2012 Joint submission op cit 78 at 5.  
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between the work programme on loss and damage and the Nairobi work 
programme—and to incorporate this knowledge, as appropriate, into Parties’ 
respective National adaptation planning processes (NAPs).  
•   ‘Enhancing data collection, including establishment of foundational 
requirements, assessment tools and processes to collect data on loss and 
damage from the adverse effects of climate change related to human mobility 
at the appropriate level, in a manner that is also sensitive to vulnerable groups 
and people and the mandates of organizations who strive to assist and protect 
these people. 
•   ‘Acting as a repository for expertise and good practice and specific 
approached to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of 
climate change relevant to population movements.’ 
• ‘Enhancing the ability of countries to conduct needs assessment and baseline 
assessments related to human mobility, in order to be able to analyse and 
make informed decisions on various risk management policies, including 
enhancing understanding and coordinating assessment methods for slow-
onset changes at national and regional levels, including through regional 
cooperation and regional activities. 
• ‘The process under the Convention and the work in this field could also serve 
to enhance understanding of processes to monitor and warn about potential 
triggering of identified tipping points. The Convention should consider 
establishing early warning and threshold-monitoring systems relevant to 
human mobility, and ensure that end users have timely access to relevant 
information (such as that related to drought and livelihood security).’ 
In line with the second goal of promoting the prevention and minimisation of loss 
and damage lies the urgent need for a range of measures and response to address 
the loss and damage that can be caused by slow-onset impacts such as sea-level 
rise. In its joint submission the following approaches to address some of the 
important gaps related to the management of human mobility and loss and damage: 
•  ‘Enhancing coordination and cooperation to strengthen social safety 
networks and resilience building efforts as part of national and subnational 
responses to loss and damage from the adverse effects of climate change, 
including through support under the Green Climate Fund (GCF).  
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• ‘Giving appropriate consideration to the needs of people who have moved 
(through migration, displacement and planned relocation) and those who have 
remained in areas of origin, including those unable to move. Many people 
will be forced to move from affected areas and adequate provisions will need 
to be designed in collaboration with relevant international institutions and 
other stakeholders to consider how to address the issue of migration, 
displacement and planned relocation. The COP has the capacity to make 
recommendations to other international bodies along these lines and 
accordingly to help coordinate their efforts. The Nansen Initiative and other 
relevant United Nations and other international organizations will engage 
with the COP in order to share policy-relevant findings and recommendations 
for its consideration.  
•  ‘Addressing residual loss and damage  from the adverse effects of climate 
change, including through specific tools, capacity and finance for assessing 
and addressing risks and impacts from sudden and slow onset changes, 
including the human mobility dimension. This could involve establishment of 
a special window   
Finally, the submission suggests that the COP should coordinate policy and ensure 
coherence in policy and action on loss and damage in relation to Paragraph 14(f) of 
the Cancun Adaption Framework. It suggests that the COP consider an 
‘international series of regional platforms to coordinate policy and actions to 
address human mobility, including systematic efforts to support responses to slow-
onset climatic stressors which may contribute to migration, displacement and/or the 
need for planned relocation of populations to safer or more habitable locations.’ It 
also suggests that: 
• ‘The Convention should link with appropriate UN and other international 
organizations working on human mobility and displacement issues, and link 
with other UN conventions such as the Convention on Biodiversity and the 
Convention to Combat Desertification, as appropriate. 
• ‘The Convention should also be used to promote policy coherence and 
relevant regulations in a manner that improves conditions for developing 
countries in line with country-driven national and regional approaches. 
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• The Adaptation Committee provides recommendations to Parties (the COP) 
on adaptation. It therefore could (in combination with Least Developed 
Country Expert Group (LEG)) collect good practice and lessons learned 
regarding human mobility in the context of climate change, but also relevant 
lessons from other areas such as development-related relocation, internal 
displacement. The Adaptation Committee also has a mandate to liaise with 
processes outside the Convention to increase the profile of adaptation and 
policy coherence. Activities such as liaising with the Nansen Initiative may 
also be appropriate.’314 
 
Raising and addressing the issue of this particular type of human movement, 
brought on by sea-level rise, within the Work Programme on Loss and Damage 
may well be the most pragmatic manner to ensure that the distinctive features of 
specific small island states are considered and taken into consideration. Under the 
umbrella of the existing climate change regime and its framework convention, this 
programme serves as a platform from where the creation and coordination of 
country-specific policy measures can take place, while giving due regard to the 
work undertaken by the international community thus far. 
 
 
 
                                                  
314 Oct 2012 Joint submission op cit 78 at 7.  
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CONCLUSION 
It has been illustrated that it is not climate change per se that inflicts harm, but the 
impacts thereof. One particular impact, sea-level rise, threatens the existence of 
small island states, forcing its inhabitants to cross international borders. The 
discussion has indicated that existing legal frameworks fall short of suitable 
protection for this particular group of people – the populations of small island 
states. 
While some had hoped that a Refugee Convention would provide refuge, 
this hope is fading. The Statelessness Convention can be relied upon once the 
nationality of an individual is no longer recognized. It is highly unlikely that states 
would not recognize the nationality of those affected by the impacts of climate 
change, creating a strong presumption of the continuation of statehood.  
In certain instances, existing international migration mechanisms can 
provide a favourable solution to climate change-related migration.315 Voluntary 
migration of individuals from small island states to other countries could be 
absorbed by current mechanisms.316 Currently, migration policies are in place in 
Tuvalu317 and migration schemes to New Zealand is possible under two migration 
schemes.318 Despite the wish of the inhabitants to remain in their home countries, 
there is a significant possibility that a time will come when they will have to 
relocate to another country.  
                                                  
315 See Hugo op cit n 34 at 33. In his work Hugo sets out the advantages of the route of existing 
international migration mechanisms.  
316 In 2009 Jane McAdam interviewed Sir Kamuta Latasi, the Speaker of the Tuvaluan Parliament 
(and former Prime Minister) who noted that: ‘The only country who helped us at the time was the 
Prime Minister of Niue who offered for some [Tuvaluan] families to travel to Niue and settle and 
work there... And about 8 or 10 families, they are all in Niue now. Some of them are citizens of New 
Zealand because Niue is under New Zealand and they have been very, very happy. But that’s 
changed...it’s out. They are trying to revive it now. So you see – the only country who responded to 
that need was a pacific brother - Niue like us.’ As quoted in McAdam 2011 Oxford op cit n152 pat 
145   
317 Gemene  op cit n 80 at 336. 
318 Gemene op cit n 80 at 338. The one migration scheme, the Pacific Access Category is often 
‘confused with and misnamed as an environmental migration agreement.’ This scheme allows an 
annual quota of 650 citizens from Fiji, Tuvalu, Kiribati and Tonga to settle in New Zealand.  
Stringent conditions, including a good command in English, a job offer etc are to be met before the 
migration process can commence.  See Hugo op cit n 34 Hugo for Existing New Zealand migration 
categories which could accommodate climate – forced migrants from the Pacific (Hugo op cit n 34 
Table 7 at 334) as well as Australia’s Temporary Safe Haven Visa Class (UJ) at Table 8.  
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The clear gap in international law makes it tempting to advocate for a new 
convention to address the issue of those displaced by the impacts of climate change. 
Yet the arguments for a convention are weak, and there is a ‘low appetite’ for a new 
legal instrument.319 Given the complex nature of the problem, the various drivers, 
voluntary versus forced movement, movement within borders, movement across 
borders, it is almost impossible to negotiate a convention that is ‘comprehensive’ 
and ‘global’. 
The newly adopted Peninsula Principles provide an overarching framework 
that can manage, when necessary, the new flow of displaced persons within 
borders. 
The Cancun Adaptation Framework, and in particular Art 14(f), is the first 
international attempt to create a space where a range of issues including human 
mobility is recognised and linked to the emerging climate finance regime.320   
In addition, the Cancun Adaptation Framework mandated the SBI to gather 
recommendations on loss and damage, and to strengthen international cooperation 
and expertise in developing an understanding of the loss and damage associated 
with the impacts of climate change, including slow-onset events such as sea-level 
rise.321 Submissions by stakeholders reflect strong arguments that the UNFCCC, 
particularly the SBI Work Program on Loss and Damage, has a pertinent role to 
play in facilitating the process of human mobility within the context of climate 
change.  
In instances where relocation will be necessary, the needs, lack of 
understanding, gaps, and challenges fall well within in the thematic areas of the SBI 
work program on Loss and Damage. This leaves room for coordination of policy on 
the loss and damage suffered by the inhabitants of small island states, and planned 
relocation as a paragraph 14(f) type of human mobility that requires enhanced 
understanding and coordination, but most of all, requires cooperation.  
                                                  
319 Warner op cit n 10 at 28. 
320 Ibid. 
321 Cancún Adaptation Framework, ‘Draft Decision -/CP.16: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long- Term Cooperative Action under the Convention’ 
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1. (adopted December 2010)  
Available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf accessed on 3 February 2014  
 para 25 & 29. 
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